Mood Constraint on Self-Appraisal; Toward Brain-Based Assessment of Dysfunctional Thinking by Waters, Allison
 
 
 
 
 
MOOD CONSTRAINT ON SELF-APPRAISAL: TOWARD BRAIN-BASED 
ASSESSMENT OF DYSFUNCTIONAL THINKING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
ALLISON C. WATERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION 
 
Presented to the Department of Psychology 
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy  
 
June 2015 
 ii 
 
DISSERTATION APPROVAL PAGE 
 
Student: Allison C. Waters 
 
Title: Mood Constraint on Self-Appraisal: Toward Brain-Based Assessment of 
Dysfunctional Thinking 
 
This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the Department of Psychology by: 
 
Don M. Tucker Chairperson 
Jennifer H. Pfeifer Core Member 
Maureen Zalewski Renier Core Member 
Mark Johnson Institutional Representative 
 
and 
 
Kimberly Andrews Espy Vice President for Research and Innovation; 
 Dean of the Graduate School  
 
Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School. 
 
Degree awarded June 2015 
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2015 Allison C. Waters 
  
 iv 
 
DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Allison C. Waters  
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Psychology 
 
June 2015 
 
Title: Mood Constraint on Self-Appraisal: Toward Brain-Based Assessment of 
Dysfunctional Thinking 
 
 
The goal of the current research is to characterize the neural mechanisms of mood-
cognition interaction in self-evaluative decision-making. Self-evaluation is mood state 
dependent. A transient decrease in positive self-evaluation bias may co-occur with sad 
mood. In clinical depression this decrease is lasting and exaggerated. The act of self-
evaluation engages frontal lobe mechanisms of emotion regulation, but it remains unclear 
how these constraints on cognition become pathological in depression. In four studies, 
dense array electroencephalography (256 dEEG) was recorded as participants performed a 
self-appraisal task. Analysis of the event-related potential was closely aligned with 
psychometric methodology. Findings elaborate on network models of neural self-regulation 
and depression pathology. Characterization of frontal lobe mechanisms in this context 
provides insight into the neural basis of adaptive and dysfunctional social behavior. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
  In a 2008 report, the World Health Organization identified depression as a 
primary contributor to the global burden of disease (World Health Organization, 2008). 
Depression accounts for the greatest number of years lost to disability worldwide. In the 
US, this amounts to $36 billion dollars in lost wages, every year (Kessler, Akiskal, & al., 
2006). It is estimated that 20% of depression sufferers who seek help do not respond to 
treatment, and up to 60% do not achieve complete remission (Kessler, Burglund, & al, 
2003). Despite the human and economic cost of this psychiatric illness, we do not 
currently understand depression well enough to treat it effectively. 
 Research in medicine and neuroscience has provided evidence of depression 
pathology in the brain. Findings do not easily coalesce, however. It appears that 
depression is a heterogeneous disorder, both in symptom profile and neural pathology 
(Fitzgerald, Laird, Maller, & Daskalakis, 2008). A current challenge in clinical 
neuroscience is to find a parsimonious explanation for seemingly disparate results. In 
depression research, it has become necessary to model neural dysfunction at the level of 
whole-brain dynamics (Drevets, Price, & Furey, 2008; Mayberg, 2003; Northoff, 
Wiebking, Feinberg, & Panksepp, 2011; Tucker & Luu, 2007). Depression is thus viewed 
as a disorder of neural self-regulation, and the complexity therein begins to account for 
heterogeneity in the symptom profile. This shift in conceptualization, however, requires 
new approaches to the analysis of neural data. It also suggests new goals for the 
assessment of neuropathology in clinical practice.  
 In the current research, I explore novel analytic methods in the study of self-
evaluative cognition. Self-evaluation is mood state dependent; positive self-appraisal 
declines with depression and improves with remission (Rimes & Watkins, 2005). 
Research in this area has been productive in elaborating on network models of brain 
function and depression pathology. However, this work has been dominated by metabolic 
measures of neural activity (Lemongne et al., 2010; Sarsam, Parkes, Roberts, Reid, & 
Kinderman, 2013; Yoshimura et al., 2013). Electrophysiological measures (i.e., EEG) 
have been less frequently applied (Poulsen, Luu, Crane, Quiring, & Tucker, 2009), 
despite offering temporal resolution on the scale of cognitive events. The current strategy 
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closely aligns EEG analysis with psychometric methodology. Psychometric research has 
made important contributions to basic psychological science, as well as to the assessment 
of psychological phenomena (e.g., Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Though beyond the scope 
of the current investigation, this combination of psychometric and EEG methodology is 
directed toward future development of brain-based assessment tools.  
 The goal of the current research is to characterize the neural mechanisms of 
mood-cognition interaction in self-evaluative decision-making. In four studies, EEG was 
recorded as participants engaged in a psychometric self-evaluation task. This task 
required participants to read adjectives and rate the extent to which the word was self-
descriptive. EEG data was then explored with a novel neuropsychometric approach and 
with factor analysis. Both of these analytic strategies were aimed at elucidating network 
properties of the EEG signature and identifying neural correlates of positive self-
appraisal bias. I also investigated mood bias in self-evaluation with experimental 
contrasts. Results elaborate on a network model of neural self-regulation that appears 
dysfunctional in depression. 
 Cogent models of brain pathology are beginning to have considerable influence 
on the nosology of psychopathological experience. The current diagnostic system is 
limited by heterogeneity within diagnostic categories and comorbidity across categories. 
A recent prevalence survey found that just under 50% of depression diagnoses are 
accompanied by an additional comorbidity (Kessler, Chiu, Demier, & Walters, 2005). A 
goal of the current investigation is to identify latent, cross-diagnostic factors. In addition 
to redefining diagnostic boundaries, findings in this domain will impact methods in 
clinical research (e.g., inclusion criteria) and may suggest alternative treatment or 
prevention strategies. 
 The study of maladaptive mood constraint on cognition may also clarify adaptive 
mechanisms of emotion regulation. Sadness is an appropriate response to failure or loss, 
and it may guide adaptive coping through reappraisal of self-schema (Lewinsohn, 
Solomon, Seeley, & Zeiss, 2000). Mood-congruent self-reflection may help people to 
adapt their expectations and behavior to new circumstances. In depression, however, 
negative cognitive bias is lasting, debilitating, and resistant to recovery (Rimes & 
Watkins, 2005). Understanding how this mood-cognition interaction becomes 
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pathological in depression may contribute to a basic understanding of affective self-
regulation. 
Chapter Outline  
 In Chapter II, I provide a theoretical framework for the current research. The is 
divided into three parts. In Part 1, I introduce a two-dimensional model of emotion: 
positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA). I operationalize mood using these 
constructs for several reasons. A dimensional model of mood provides a means to 
quantify variation in emotional experience as co-ordinates on a two-dimensional axis.  
Lability on the PA scale has been associated with mood disorders; low PA is a specific 
predictor of depression. The affective-arousal represented by PA and NA is fundamental 
to a control-systems model of brain function. In Part 2, I describe this model of neural 
self-regulation, which will be used as a framework for interpreting the results of the 
current research. I conclude Chapter II with a brief discussion about neurometrics, brain-
based measures of psychological functioning.  
 The methods developed for the current investigation convolve psychometric 
analysis with EEG research. In Chapter III, I provide background in psychometric and 
event-related potential (ERP) methods, and introduce the research strategy. In Part 1, I 
review a neuropsychometric approach to the study of self-evaluative cognition. In this 
research, the psychometric properties of word stimuli are used to identify neural activity 
associated with PA and NA. Results suggest network activity in the ERP signature of 
self-evaluation. In Part 2, I propose an extension of this research: decomposition of the 
ERP using principal components analysis (PCA). Such factor analytic techniques are 
commonly used in psychometric research to characterize the latent structure of a 
construct, such as PA and NA dimensionality in emotion. I propose that the latent 
structure of the self-evaluative ERP will likewise reflect meaningful dimensions, and that 
dimensions of neural activity will reflect a control-systems model of brain function.  
 I conclude Chapter III by describing an empirical approach to this proposal. I 
derive hypotheses for this research from the ERP literature, wherein ERP components are 
typically studied in isolation. To avoid redundancy in subsequent chapters, Part 3 also 
serves as in introduction to three studies. With Study 1, I investigate self-evaluative 
cognition in depression. Results, provided in Chapter IV, demonstrate that as depressive 
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symptoms become more severe, positive self-evaluation bias decreases. I identify three 
latent factors, or components, that may be relevant to this pathological mood-cognition 
interaction. One component appears exaggerated in the clinical sample, while another is 
attenuated. I speculate that these results might reflect an exchange in dominance between 
affect-biased, neural control systems. These findings may provide insight into the neural 
mechanics of co-morbid symptoms of anxiety and depression.  
 In Chapter V, I present the results of Study 2, which further characterize mood-
cognition interaction in components of the evaluative ERP. Study 2 provides a 
“neurotypical” baseline for results of Study 1. To better identify aspects of the neural 
signature that are specific to self-processing, I also introduce a control task. Participants 
evaluate themselves in one condition, and a public figure, President Obama, in another 
condition. Individual differences in PA predict self-evaluative behavior, but not 
evaluation of the President. PA is further implicated as a neural correlate of evaluative 
cognition. Importantly, the component structure observed in Study 1 is replicated in both 
Study 2 and Study 3.  
 The third study in the series is intended for replication of the exploratory findings 
in Study 2. In Chapter VI, I provide results of this final study in the series. In Study 3, I 
also introduce a second control condition. This task involves categorizing word stimuli; 
participants must engage in reading and decision-making, but the extent of social 
evaluation is decreased. Effects of this contrast appear in anterior channels implicating 
the frontal lobe in self-specific processing.  
 In Chapter VII, I review and synthesize results from the neuropsychometric 
analysis, as well as Studies 1-3. Findings are interpreted within a control-systems 
framework of neural self-regulation. The dimensional structure of the decision-making 
ERP suggests three consecutive stages of processing that involve mood-cognition 
interaction. These findings may differentiate aspects of neural self-regulation in self-
evaluation that are exaggerated in anxiety, and attenuated in depression. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
  In this chapter, I present a theoretical framework for the current research. To 
begin, I provide rationale for a dimensional approach to the study of emotion. I introduce 
a two-dimensional model of affective-arousal; positive affect (PA) and negative affect 
(NA). These constructs are used to describe individual differences in trait mood. The PA 
scale is a continuum of arousal with valence. It spans from depression to elation. The NA 
continuum spans from anxious to calm. I also discuss the convergence of PA and NA 
with other measures of affective experience, such as personality, behavior and the 
perception of emotion. In clinical populations, low trait PA predicts symptoms of mood 
disorders, while NA is aligned with anxiety disorders and general distress. A goal of the 
current research is to test the predictive specificity of these mood dimensions in healthy 
and mood disordered self-evaluative behavior. 
 In the second half of this chapter, I present a model of brain function wherein 
dimensions of affective-arousal, PA and NA, are fundamental to self-regulatory 
dynamics. I propose that self-regulation in the brain involves competing neural systems. 
These are engaged in a dynamic of reciprocal motivation and constraint, which is 
fundamentally affective. I provide a brief overview of this control-systems model of 
neural self-regulation, beginning with the visceral and somatic divisions of the brain. The 
frontal lobe can be further divided into a dorsal cortico-limbic system, and a ventral 
cortico-limbic systems. The limbic core of the dorsal system provides a PA bias that 
drives projective, impulsive functions. Ventral functions are more responsive to the 
environment, and ventral limbic structures drive this vigilance with an NA bias. Though 
basic in its representation of frontal lobe functioning, I will use this control-systems 
model as a theoretical framework for the current research. 
 To illustrate the application of this framework, I then provide an example of 
dorsal and ventral reciprocity in motor action regulation. I extend these properties of 
motor control in the frontal lobe to psychological phenomena. I describe neurological 
disorders in which disruption of frontal lobe systems leads to symptoms of depression. I 
then apply the control-systems model to cognition and consider how affective-arousal 
biases in the brain provide motivation and constraint on self-evaluative decisions. A goal 
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of the current research is to understand how dysfunction in neural self-regulation 
contributes to the symptomatic decline of positive self-appraisal in depression. 
 I begin the final section of this chapter by considering functional specialization in 
the left and right hemispheres as it relates to a neural control dynamic. I review evidence 
of functional and affective specialization in the cortical hemispheres that suggest 
hypotheses for the current research. I then introduce a measure of frontal lobe activity, 
alpha asymmetry, that captures trait-like characteristics of emotion regulation. I consider 
an explanation for this phenomenon within a control-systems framework. To conclude 
this chapter, I briefly discuss issues in the development of brain-based assessment tools, 
or neurometrics, and contextualize the current research relative to that goal.  
Part I: Affective Cognition 
 Concepts of affect. For something that is so essential to the human experience, 
emotion is surprisingly difficult to define and measure. In contemporary emotion 
research, definitions fall roughly into two categories: categorical and dimensional. The 
current investigation assumes a dimensional model of affect, and tests some related 
assumptions. Discrete and dimensional theories share a common vernacular, however, so 
before providing rationale for these assumptions it may be necessary to define some 
terms: emotion, primary-process emotion, and mood. These words could be synonyms 
but they are also used to refer to different concepts. According to a dimensional view, 
however, these concepts coalesce as multiple facets of our core affective nature.  
 The dominant paradigm in emotion research divides emotions into discrete 
categories of experience.  According to Ekman and colleagues, basic emotions include: 
happiness, sadness, surprise, fear, anger and disgust (Ekman & Friesen, 1971). The 
theory posits that these basic emotions are universal, while other emotions are a product 
of socialization (Izard, 2007). In this context, an emotion is characterized as a set of 
physiological and cognitive criteria that appear in response to a stimulus (internal or 
external). Emotions have valence, distinct from neutral states of arousal. The onset of an 
emotion is rapid, but the experience may persist for seconds or minutes (A. Damasio, 
2012). Recent research has aimed to associate discrete emotions with a particular set of 
neural structures, with limited success (Barrett & Wager, 2006; Berridge & Scherer, 
2003; Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002). A strength of this categorical approach is 
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its face validity; it fits with folk wisdom and is intuitive. This resulted in many decades of 
productive investigation, and some of the first forays into the affective brain.  
 As the field of clinical and affective neuroscience progresses, however, the 
foundational evidence for basic emotions is being systematically refuted (Russell, 2009; 
Zachar & Ellis, 2012). One weakness of the categorical approach, germane to the current 
research, is that it fails to account for overlapping characteristics of mood and anxiety 
disorders. Pathologies of mood and anxiety are frequently co-morbid, which suggests 
shared dimensions that cannot be explained with a categorical nosology (T. A. Brown, 
Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998; Kessler, Berglund, et al., 2005; Lamers et al., 2011). In this 
sense, the current diagnostic system of psychiatric disorders is aligned with discrete 
theories of emotion. Although it may seem obvious to the experiencer that these 
categories exist in nature, it has been difficult to translate this subjective ontology to 
brain function (Russell, 2009).  
 This is particularly true for cortical mapping of discrete emotions. In humans, 
these maps invariably involve functions of the frontal cortex, which evolved according to 
the selective constraints of a highly social niche (Dunbar & Shultz, 2007). The frontal 
cortex was also the latest to develop in mammalian cortical evolution. To localize 
emotion in the frontal cortex, it follows, affective experience is denied to mammals of 
lower phylogeny. The promising work of Jaak Panksepp, addresses this criticism 
carefully. Panksepp (2012) posits a theoretical model of emotion systems, derived largely 
from animal research. Insofar as these systems pertain to specific classes of behavior 
(e.g., seeking, play), Panksepp’s model has been aligned with discrete emotion theories 
(Zachar & Ellis, 2012). However, his work describes primary-process emotions that are 
phylogenetically conserved and largely subcortical. This subcortical root of affective 
experience is shown to be a foundation of brain function, which is then elaborated in 
higher cortical structures (Panksepp & Biven, 2012).  
 Affective experience involves dynamic movement along a continuous axis 
(Osgood, 1952; Russell, 2009; Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999). From primary process 
emotion to personality, individual differences in affect-biased brain function aggregates 
in trait-like characteristics (Waters & Tucker, 2013a). This aggregate can be recognized 
as mood, an affective bias that is relatively stable for hours or days. In individuals, a 
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mood tendency, or trait mood, is stable over the lifespan. There is only an abstract 
transition from trait mood to personality, which can also be measured within the same 
dimensional framework (Saucier et al., 2014). In the current research, these dimensions 
of affect are viewed as fundamental properties of the brain. The brain self-regulates 
through a dynamic balance of reciprocal control systems (Tucker & Luu, 2012). Within 
this dynamic system, affect provides motivation and constraint on brain processes that 
give rise to cognition and complex human behavior.  
 A dimensional model of affect. A dimensional approach to understanding 
emotion has been guiding psychological research (Barrett & Wager, 2006; Russell, 2009; 
Sutton & Davidson, 1997; Tellegen et al., 1999; Tucker & Luu, 2007). The current 
research adopts the terminology of Watson and Tellegen (1985), who pioneered a 
linguistic approach to the study of emotion.  
 We can gather important information about affective experience by looking 
closely at how it is described in words. A linguistic approach to the study of emotion and 
personality first identifies all descriptor words in a lexicon, by sorting a dictionary, for 
example. A survey of all words is constructed; a person might be asked to rate the extent 
to which a word is self-descriptive or descriptive of another person. When a sufficient 
number of these surveys have been completed, researchers use factor analysis to look for 
consistent patterns. Responses to some words will be highly correlated (e.g., enthusiastic 
and proud), and others will not (e.g., determined and afraid). Overall, these correlation 
patterns show how some words cluster together. The cluster, or latent factor, can be 
described as the central tendency of the word group. In emotion research, the factor 
structure describes something fundamental about the dimensional nature of emotional 
experience.   
  In psychometric research, there will always be some debate about how many 
factors to retain in a factor analysis, and how to describe those factors (Fabrigar, 
Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999). Some of these decisions are made statistically, 
but ultimately, the strength of a dimensional model is determined by its convergent 
validity and utility as a predictive metric. For example, emotional experience can be 
described using two factors: arousal and pleasantness (Russell, 1979). This two-factor 
structure accounts for over two thirds of the variance in large surveys. That is to say, all 
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emotion words can be characterized with coordinates within this axis. Though 
conceptually useful and statistically sound, it is difficult to relate this model to biological 
systems. In a living organism, pleasantness cannot exist when arousal approaches zero.   
 Alternatively, the arousal and pleasantness axis can be rotated 45 degees. In 
doing, the model retains statistical strength but also suggests a new theoretical model 
based on affective arousal. In this model, the axis are labeled as Positive Affect (PA) and 
Negative Affect (NA) (Watson & Tellegen, 1985) PA and NA, it follows, are not 
opposite poles of a dipolar scale. PA represents a continuum from unpleasant, low 
arousal of depressive nature to pleasant, high arousal of an elated nature. Sadness and 
lethargy are characteristics of a low PA state, while high PA descriptors reflect 
pleasurable engagement in the world, particularly the social world. NA, in contrast, 
reflects a continuum from calmness to anxiety. NA can be described as a measure of 
subjective distress. 
 Convergence with PA and NA. Importantly, this affective-arousal model 
converges with psychometric research in other domains of affective experience. A 
contemporary of Auke Tellegen and David Watson, Robert Thayer, arrived at a 
convergent structure though his investigation focused on features of arousal instead of 
emotion. Thayer (1978) described the continua as tired to vigorous and calm to tense. 
When focus is on behavior and post-goal seeking emotion is removed, a two-factor model 
can be described as approach and avoidance orientation (Carver, 2004; Davidson & 
Irwin, 1999; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010). Related constructs also emerge when the 
investigation is more strictly limited to descriptors of emotion (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988), or more broadly to personality traits, extraversion and neuroticism 
(Tellegen, 1988). Although it has also been useful to understand personality relative to 
five factors (i.e., Big Five), contemporary research indicates that a two-factor structure of 
personality, described as social propriety and dynamism, generalizes across cultures 
(Saucier et al., 2014). The PA and NA structure also emerges even when stimuli are not 
linguistic, such as facial expressions (Stone, 1988). Each of these models contribute 
important nuance to theoretical research. The extent of convergence, however, suggests 
something fundamental about affective experience. 
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 The research above derived insight from the way in which people describe their 
own affective experience or that of an observed other. An important extension of this 
work is to the appraisal of emotional stimuli, in general. For example, people can assign 
affective characteristics to pictures, objects or scenes. This literature is quite large. For 
research purposes, databases of stimuli have been developed so that the psychometric 
properties of each picture can be broadly assessed and understood. When emotional 
pictures are arranged on an arousal and valence axis, the distribution typically takes on a 
circumflex shape; items tend to fall along the diagonals.  
 The implication is that the PA/NA structure also describes our experience of 
emotional stimuli. This shouldn’t be surprising. We would expect our experience of 
objects to utilize the same affective mechanisms that we use when we experience our 
self. Yet in basic research, particularly in cognitive neuroscience, stimuli are contrasted 
according to valence (i.e., good/bad) and balanced for arousal features. We seek to 
understand, for example, differences in the neural response to good and bad stimuli. It 
may be more biologically relevant, however, to instead to define the emotional attribution 
of experimental stimuli along the dimensions of PA and NA.  
 Low positive affect is a central characteristic of depression. The goal of this 
initial psychometric research was deeply theoretical; aimed at understanding the nature of 
emotional experience. In practice, PA and NA constructs have been validated as a 
predictor of future wellbeing. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) is a 
psychometric designed to score an individual on PA and NA scales (Watson et al., 1988). 
On the PANAS, PA and NA are each represented by ten words that correlate highly with 
the respective factor. The metric has undergone rigorous reliability and validity testing, 
and has been normed in healthy, clinical and developmental populations(Crawford & 
Henry, 2004; Thompson, 2007).   
 PA and NA scores predict patterns of self-appraisal with surprising specificity. 
Poulsen et al., (2009) found PA scores to strongly predict self-appraisal of socially 
desirable trait words. NA scores, in contrast, better predicted responses to undesirable 
traits. Scores on the NA subscale also converge with measures of subjective stress-level, 
frequency of life-stressors, dysfunctional coping strategies and health concerns. PA 
scores correlate with social success, as well as levels of social activity (Lyubomirsky, 
 11 
King, & Diener, 2005). Experimental studies suggest a causal relationship between trait 
positive affect and a number of success-related variables: relationship satisfaction, 
health/mortality, employment. Low PA scores uniquely predict the likelihood of future 
depressive episodes (Gencoz & Tulin, 2002). Low trait PA is a specific risk factor for 
depression.  
 In clinical populations, PA and NA are differentiated in important ways (Clark & 
Watson, 1991). NA has been described as a measure of subjective distress and can thus 
indicate the severity of psychological problems (D. Watson et al., 1995). The NA 
construct is best aligned with anxiety disorders, although high NA is associated with 
anxiety, depression and other psychiatric disorders. In very severe depression, however, 
NA is less predictive, suggesting an important shift in the course of the disorder. Low PA 
scores discriminate depression from other psychiatric disorders (Clark & Watson, 1991). 
Depression can be characterized as a disorder of positive affect. Very high PA is 
associated with manic states, and lability along the PA axis describes bipolar disorder 
(Lovejoy & Steuerwald, 1995). This unique pathology suggests some biological basis of 
positive affect that is discrete enough to give rise to bipolar pathology (Gruber, Johnson, 
Oveis, & Keltner, 2008).  
Part II: A Model of Affective Self-Regulation in the Frontal Lobe  
 The brain regulates itself. If positive and negative affective-arousal dimensions 
are fundamental to self-reported emotional experience, this dimensionality might also be 
apparent in the neural mechanisms of emotional experience (Tucker & Williamson, 
1984). A goal of the current research is to identify neural correlates of mood-cognition 
interaction during self-evaluative cognition. Current methods are aimed at characterizing 
a network model of cortical functioning. In this section, I will outline a basic model of 
frontal lobe function, wherein dimensions of affective-arousal (positive and negative) are 
fundamental to self-regulatory dynamics. Though overly simplified, this model provides 
a framework for speculation on how psychological phenomena, such as self and 
personality, might emerge from frontal lobe functioning.  
 A contemporary student of the brain is afforded certain luxuries. While a 
comprehensive understanding of brain function remains elusive, the field has arrived at 
some clarity on previously vexing issues. For example, it is clear now that the brain 
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functions without a conductor; it is a self-regulating system. The brain functions as a 
dynamic balance of inter-related systems. Each control system provides a force of 
opposition that sums to an outcome: physiological, behavioral, and psychological.  
 Though over-simplified, neural dynamics can be described using principals of 
early ship navigation, or cybernetics (Tucker & Luu, 2007, 2012; Waters & Tucker, 
2013a). Using cybernetic action, a ship projects a direct course to its destination, but must 
constantly adapt its planned trajectory to account for environmental conditions. The sum 
of those opposing forces (i.e., projection and correction) determines the action of the 
ship, at any given moment. Turning the metaphor back to the brain, the forces in 
opposition are recognized as fundamentally affective. This assumption is also a luxury of 
contemporary neuroscience. Once a niche area of study, affect is now viewed as 
fundamental to brain function. From the most ancient formations of the brain stem and 
midbrain, to the phylogenetically new cortical sheet, the cybernetic forces of arousal (i.e., 
motivation and constraint) are inherently affective.  
 The visceral and somatic brain; inward and outward orientation. Though 
mood is embodied at all levels of the neural axis, we address this question at the level of 
the frontal lobe; the area most unique to humans (Berridge & Scherer, 2003). The 
mechanics of self-regulation in the frontal lobe introduce a third assumption of 
contemporary neuroscience, still underappreciated: cognitive processes of the highest 
order emerge from the sensory and motor systems (Tucker, 2007). The cybernetics of 
motor action also applies to cognition. This observation leads us to develop hypotheses 
about how the frontal cortex acts to self-regulate not just motor action but also the 
seemingly ineffable phenomena of the mind.  
 The brain can be roughly divided into two anatomical-functional divisions. The 
visceral brain is concerned with sensing internal needs and driving automatic bodily 
functions. The somatic brain interfaces with the environment. This includes the sensory 
and motor systems of the posterior and anterior cortex, respectively. There is a cybernetic 
balance between these two components of the brain, a constant negotiation of internal 
drives and conflicting environmental demands. The concerns of the outer cortex are 
largely somatic (e.g., primary sensory and motor cortices, association cortices), although 
visceral functions are also represented in the innermost cortical areas (e.g., cingulate 
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cortex, ventral pre-frontal cortex). These innermost cortices, together with subcortical 
structures of the visceral brain, comprise the limbic system. The visceral-somatic 
dichotomy spans all levels of the neural axis. With the goal of sketching an anatomical-
functional model of the human frontal lobe, however, it will suffice to assign affective 
drives to the limbic system (e.g., cingulate cortex, amygdala), and somatic concerns to 
non-limbic cortex (e.g., dorsal prefrontal cortex).    
 PA and NA bias in dorsal and ventral cortico-limbic systems. The simplicity 
of this visceral-somatic dichotomy breaks down in areas of the brain where somatic and 
visceral concerns negotiate.  This intersection is well represented in the frontal lobe. In 
humans, prefrontal cortex is the most recent product of encephalization, a process by 
which evolution elaborates on the anatomy and function of more primitive structures 
(Glenn Northcutt & Kaas, 1995). Integrated circuitry in the prefrontal cortex is involved 
in much of what we identify as uniquely human: the ability to inhibit impulses in service 
of long term goals, complex problem-solving, theory of mind and other forms of social 
cognition (Nauta, 1993). The frontal lobe, however, is most essentially related to motor 
action (Goldman-Rakic, Bates, & Chafee, 1992). It follows that the basic mechanisms of 
motor control provide guiding principals, if not the actual substrate, for higher order 
psychological processes.  
 To begin to make sense of this complex structure, it is useful to further subdivide 
the frontal cortex into subordinate dorsal and ventral divisions. These are the cybernetic 
moieties of the frontal lobe. It is also at this level of complexity that mood dimensionality 
in brain function is apparent; processes are biased by PA in the dorsal stream and, by NA 
in the ventral stream. In the cybernetic self-regulation of the frontal cortex, PA and NA 
provide the impetus and constraint, respectively. In a recent chapter, Waters & Tucker 
(2013a) reviewed evidence that differentiates dorsal and ventral aspects of the frontal 
cortex in form and function. The origin of this cybernetic structure is apparent in theories 
of cortical evolution (Sanides, 1970), as well as patterns of neural development observed 
in the embryonic brain (Rakic, 2009). The specialized functions of dorsal and ventral 
moieties in the mature brain emerge from the particular combination of specialized cell 
types, neurotransmitter systems, tissue organization and connectivity patterns (reviewed 
in Tucker & Luu, 2012; Waters & Tucker, 2013a).  
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 The limbic core of the ventral system includes the amgydala, with bidirectional 
connections to orbital frontal cortex, and ventral cingulate cortex (Barbas & Pandya, 
1989; Pandya & Barnes, 1987). The ventral stream derives its negative affective bias 
from these structures, which motivate vigilant, attentive functions of the somatic cortex. 
The ventral cortex transitions from visceral to somatic in regions of the frontal pole, 
lateral cortex and ventral motor areas. This cortical component asserts control over limbic 
drives, disinhibiting or suppressing negative affect according to environmental demands.  
 In the dorsal moiety, there is also reciprocal control between somatic and limbic 
components (Barbas & Pandya, 1989; Pandya & Barnes, 1987). From the limbic core of 
the dorsal moiety, however, emerges a positive affective bias, which motivates projective 
functions of the dorsal cortex. The visceral component of the dorsal stream includes most 
of the classic Papez circuit; subcortical structures arch from the hippocampus just lateral 
to midline cingulate cortex. The dorsal frontal cortex, functioning primarily to interface 
with the environment, also controls this limbic component by suppressing or disinhibiting 
the limbic bias.  
 Cognition from motor control in the frontal cortex. The self-regulation of 
motor action provides an accessible demonstration of the dynamics described above. The 
dorsal system provides a ballistic projection of motion (e.g., reaching for the cup of 
coffee), while the ventral system adapts the motion according to feedback from the 
environment (e.g., fine motor adjustment in response to the temperature of the mug). In 
this simple motor task, visceral components (i.e., limbic) provide affective biases that 
motivate and constrain somatic (i.e., cortical) function. These affective biases provide the 
motivation to act on the ballistic motor plan (positive affect) and anxious attention to cues 
that will guide fine motor adjustment (negative affect).  
 The somatic components also regulate the limbic structures, mediating the extent 
of emotional drive. If this reciprocal control were not in place, we would likely push the 
cup over with an over-enthusiastic motor plan. Or we would fail to grasp the cup 
altogether and instead make ongoing, obsessive and anxious fine motor adjustments. The 
two systems provide reciprocal control. From this description of frontal lobe self-
regulation in motor action, we can imagine how complex psychological phenomena 
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might emerge from reciprocal control systems. It also becomes clear that cognition and 
emotion are not separable functions, but interdependent properties of brain function.  
 Having established this framework of frontal lobe self-regulation, however over-
simplified, it is now possible to speculate on the neural properties of psychological 
phenomena. When humans report on their affective experience, or the traits of other 
people, those reports take on a dimensionality that resonates with these neural control 
processes. A bias toward one control process can be observed in complex human 
behavior (Tucker & Williamson, 1984). Unsurprisingly, affective biases that are 
fundamental to brain function manifest as trait-like tendencies in mood (i.e., positive and 
negative affect), personality (i.e., extraversion, neuroticism) and psychopathology (i.e., 
externalizing and internalizing disorders). 
 Depression from dysfunction in neural control systems. Frank Benson and 
Dietrich Blumer (1975) reviewed psychological changes associated with specific 
neurological impairments in frontal control systems. The authors observed that when a 
lesion occurs in dorsal limbic structures, symptoms relate to motivation (i.e., positive 
affect). In the motor system, this presents as akinetic mutism or transcortical motor 
aphasia. These fundamentally motor conditions also render the patient psychologically 
inert, exhibiting a lack of behavior activation and blunted affect. Ironically, these 
neurological symptoms are sometimes described as pseudodepression because the 
etiological root was neurological not “psychological.” Yet dorsal limbic hypofrontality is 
also a common characteristic in patients with Major Depressive Disorder, where etiology 
is considered psychiatric (Mayberg, 1997). This neural abnormality is also associated 
with motor and cognitive symptoms of depression; physical and mental slowness. Despite 
these shared neural origins, depression is not viewed as a neurological disorder.  
 When both neurological and psychiatric patients present with pathology specific 
to a region of the frontal cortex, the psychological profile is consistent. With damage to 
the ventral system, the dorsal system is under regulated. This failure to constrain the 
impulsive, expectant mode inherent to dorsal stream presents as disinhibitory 
psychopathology (Blumer & Benson, 1975). A classic case study of disinhibition 
syndrome is Phineas Gage, who suffered damage to his ventral prefrontal cortex when a 
tamping rod was thrown through his head (H. Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda, & 
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Damasio, 1994). More focal lesions to the ventral prefrontal cortex are associated with 
severely decreased capacity to predict negative social consequences of actions, including 
a related psychiatric condition known as pseudopsychopathic syndrome (Blumer & 
Benson, 1975). Brain imaging research on psychopathy is also consistent with this view. 
Psychopaths appear to have a specific deficit in self-regulation, such that social 
information can be acquired, but it fails to elicit the appropriate adjustments of behavior 
(Kiehl, 2006). When the failure is in the cortical control of limbic functions in the ventral 
cortex, the ventral limbic structures may be disinhibited. Unsurprisingly, state, trait and 
and pathological anxiety are associated with hyperactivity in the ventral limbic structures 
(Etkin & Wager, 2007; Phan Luu, Collins, & Tucker, 2000).  
 Depression, in contrast, is associated with dorsal hypofrontality and anxiety is 
associated with ventral hyperfrontality (Drevets et al., 2008; Fitzgerald et al., 2008; 
Mayberg, 1997). The more common clinical presentation, however, is complicated by co-
morbid anxiety and depression (Kessler, Berglund, et al., 2005; Lamers et al., 2011). This 
is not surprising, as a control-systems model would predict compensatory reciprocity. 
Co-morbidity is a common obstacle to effective treatment planning for both patient and 
clinician. In a co-morbid presentation, it is difficult to identify the primary source of 
pathology, or the domain most amenable to change. Although self-report psychometrics 
provide a gross measure of control biases, a more direct measure of frontal lobe control 
systems – dorsal and ventral, somatic and limbic – might better characterize disorders of 
affect and direct treatment.  
 Self-evaluative cognition from control systems of the brain. I return now to 
self-evaluation, as defined by the act of self-report on basic psychometric assessments. In 
psychometric research, population level statistics are used to characterize patterns in 
human experience. An individual’s aggregated scores on a psychometric scale describe 
their affective tendencies relative to other people. Following the discussion above, these 
affective traits emerge from neural control biases. Variance in trait affect might reflect 
variance in control system bias (i.e., the dominance of one system over another). A goal 
of the current research is to characterize the action of neural control systems in the 
development of a self-evaluative decision. One approach to this aim will be to identify 
neural correlates of trait affect in neural measures during self-evaluation.  
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 A single act of self-appraisal emerges from cybernetic control processes in the 
frontal lobe. Using motor action regulation as a template, we can speculate on the 
processes that may be involved in making this decision. We might imagine a self-schema, 
embodied in memory, as a learned, probabilistic model. Like a ballistic motor plan, the 
self-schema is motivated by positive affect and thus formulated on the substrate of 
positive hedonic tone. An individual with pathologically low positive affect might suffer, 
quite literally, from an insufficient self. The word stimulus (and recognition of its 
meaning) must then be compared to this insufficient predictive model, or self-schema. 
Vigilant ventral functions are engaged to assess the stimulus relative to internal need 
states. Should ventral-limbic bias overwhelm the dynamic, as in high anxiety, an 
individual might be overly attentive to the content of the word (e.g., qualities of social 
desirability or valence). As the motor plan is finely adjusted according to environmental 
information, so the self-schema is elaborated with anxious information.  
 In Chapter III, I will approach this model of self-evaluative cognition from the 
perspective of event-related potential research. The EEG recording suggests stages of 
neural processing that align with the theoretical process described above. What this 
theoretical exercise highlights is that self, like any motor or cognitive process, is an 
emergent property of a self-regulating, system of systems. In this formulation, affect is 
not a mediator, but a substrate of the self. A core property of the brain, and thus the self, 
is affective. 
Part III: Toward Brain-Based Metrics of Neural Self-Regulation 
 Hemispheric specialization: a superordinate control system. The self-
regulation in the brain is achieved through reciprocal control processes in the somatic and 
visceral systems, and between the dorsal and ventral streams. On a more global scale, 
functional divisions can be made from the left and right hemisphere. Although 
differences can be subtle, the division of functions between hemispheres is a key 
adaptation in the course of human evolution; cognitive capacity is enhanced by the 
specialization of local circuitry, while global connectivity is retained. (Striedter, 2005). 
Hemispheric specialization allowed this capacity to evolve with limited metabolic cost 
and increase in skull diameter (Striedter, 2005).  
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 In most humans, the left hemisphere is object oriented. It is dominant for 
processes related to language and speech production, in particular. This effect is robust 
enough that ERP experiments that involve language, including self-evaluation, will show 
some left lateralization on the head surface (Neville & Bavelier, 1998). The right 
hemisphere, in contrast, appears to be dominant in spatial operations (Weintraub & 
Mesulam, 1987). Of the two hemispheres the right is also more concerned with affect 
(Schwartz, Davidson, & Maer, 1975; Tucker, Hartry-Speiser, McDougal, Luu, & 
Degrandpre, 1999). Even in these hallmark domains, the functional distinction between 
hemispheres is less one of specialization and more of style. The left hemisphere, for 
example, is independently adept at solving spatial problems. Important aspects of 
language, such as emotional prosody, are dominated by the right hemisphere (Ross & 
Mesulam, 1979).  
 The left and right hemispheres also take on some functions of the ventral cortico-
limbic and dorsal cortico-limbic system, respectively. The left hemisphere has an 
affective bias that is preferentially anxious (i.e., negative affect). This is consistent with 
left hemisphere bias for serial and object oriented processing in the ventral “what” path. 
The right hemisphere, in contrast, is more aligned with the positive bias of the dorsal 
system, which motivates the holistic processing style represented in the “where” 
pathway. More evidence for this asymmetric affective bias is drawn from neurological 
cases in which specific lesions to left and right cortices are associated with symptoms 
related to NA and PA, respectively (Gainotti, 1989; Robinson, Kubos, Starr, Rao, & 
Price, 1984).  
 First principals of neural self-regulation suggest that the functional dynamic 
between hemispheres is more competitive that collaborative. Transcollosal fibers are 
mostly inhibitory, suggesting that like somatic and visceral systems, as well as dorsal and 
ventral moieties, the hemispheres are also engaged in a dynamic of reciprocal control 
(Bloom & Hynd, 2005). In the current research, I anticipated some left-lateralization of 
the ERP in processes related to reading and semantic retrieval.  Later in the decision-
making epoch, I predicted some right lateralization in ERPs related to emotion 
processing. The affective-arousal, control-systems model also suggests that some left 
hemisphere functions take on an NA bias, while some right hemisphere functions take on 
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a PA bias. I will test this hypothesis by assessing correlations between individual 
differences in trait affect and neural measures in each hemisphere. If this hypothesis is 
confirmed, however, the finding will contradict evidence derived from research on alpha 
asymmetry, which predicts a different pattern of affective bias in frontal cortices. 
  Alpha asymmetry and mood dimensionality. Frontal asymmetry in the EEG 
alpha frequency band has been carefully studied, beginning with the seminal work of 
Richard Davidson (e.g., 1992). On the time scale of cognitive events, alpha band 
oscillations are relatively slow (8-12 Hz). The presence of alpha over frontal cortex 
reflects functional quiescence, or “deactivation,” because the subtle variations that 
convey information in the brain are absent. Alpha asymmetry refers to the differential in 
alpha power between left and right anterior channels, suggesting that one hemisphere is 
more active (less alpha) than the other (more alpha). Alpha asymmetry appears 
consistently in depressed and anxious people; greater activation is observed in the right 
frontal cortex, relative to the left (Thibodeau, Jorgensen, & Kim, 2006). In over 100 
studies alpha asymmetry has been reliably associated with emotion and behavior 
(reviewed in Coan & Allen, 2004). 
 Alpha asymmetry is trait-like; it is relatively stable in individuals over time. An 
aspect of the phenomenon is heritable, and thus alpha asymmetry is considered 
endophenotypic (Stewart, Bismark, Towers, Coan, & Allen, 2010). The alpha metric not 
only discriminates acutely depressed from non-depressed individuals (Stewart, Coan, 
Towers, & Allen, 2011), but also identifies non-depressed people who are at risk for the 
disorder (Bruder et al., 2005). For these reasons, alpha asymmetry was a promising brain-
based measure of dysfunctional emotion regulation in the frontal cortex. However, effect 
sizes are moderate (Thibodeau et al., 2006) and the phenomenon is not specific to mood 
and anxiety disorders. In clinical populations, it alpha asymmetry is instead broadly 
related to internalizing disorders (Stewart, Levin-Silton, Sass, Heller, & Miller, 2008). In 
non-clinical populations, it has been associated with withdrawal motivation, (e.g., Coan, 
Allen, & McKnight, 2006) and approach motivation (e.g., Davidson, 1998).  
  A common interpretation of these findings is that cortical activation (i.e., 
decreased alpha power) in the right frontal hemisphere reflects active generation of 
negative affect; cortical activation in the left hemisphere reflects generation of positive 
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affect. This is inconsistent with the control-systems hypothesis, which posits NA bias in 
left hemisphere and PA bias in the right hemisphere. An alternative explanation for the 
alpha findings is that cortical activation represents the suppression of limbic drive, not 
generation of affect. This explanation is more consistent with the evidence reviewed in 
the previous section.  
 Toward a neurometric of control processes in the frontal lobe. The alpha 
asymmetry metric has thus far fallen short as a brain-based assessment of mood 
dysfunction. Both its promise and limitations, however, represent a growing area of 
interest and discussion in clinical neuroscience (Briesemeister, Tamm, Heine, & Jacobs, 
2013; Buzsaki & Watson, 2012; Miller, 2010; Siegle et al., 2012). Though currently 
beyond the scope of neuroscience and engineering, one can imagine a future in which 
neurometrics have been constructed for early detection and treatment of some 
psychological disorders. The current research was motivated by this distant goal. The 
methods reviewed in the chapter to follow reflect an attempt to align the analysis of 
neural activity with psychometric research, the discipline that has been most productive 
in developing measures of psychological phenomena for clinical use.  
 Though directed toward the development of brain-based assessment tools, the 
current research yields results that are more relevant to basic science. A goal of the 
research described in subsequent chapters is to identify neural correlates of self-appraisal 
bias. Findings may be theoretically informative, but a neurometric measure of positivity 
bias would be redundant with the behavior itself. However, there are different neural 
conditions that might contribute to the loss of positive bias in depression. This points the 
broader goal of this research: to characterize network activity in the ERP signature. 
Measures of network activity would not be redundant with the behavior, but might 
instead suggest how the behavior (i.e., self-evaluation) is constrained by affective control 
bias.  
 In Chapter III, I describe a methodological approach to this goal using statistical 
decomposition of the EEG data. I hypothesized that this strategy would separate the ERP 
data into functional components. Results were then interpreted within a control-systems 
framework of neural self-regulation. This model of frontal cortical functioning suggests 
several dynamic profiles that might account for the loss of positive self-appraisal bias in 
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depression. A broader goal for this area of research is to develop measures of network 
status that might differentiate these dynamic profiles of frontal lobe self-regulation. 
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CHAPTER III 
PSYCHOMETRICS IN EEG RESEARCH 
 The previous chapter provided a theoretical context for this research. In Chapter 
III, I derive specific hypothesis from a review of the event-related potential (ERP) 
literature. To begin, I introduce a neuropsychometric approach to the analysis of 
brainwave data. This analytic approach convolves psychometric and ERP methods in an 
attempt to identify neural activity related to the dimensions of trait affect:  PA and NA, 
respectively. I then review an application of the neuropsychometric approach to the study 
of self-evaluative cognition. Results of this investigation suggested two systems of 
cortical activity within the evaluative epoch. I conclude by discussing the limitations of 
the neuropsychometric approach. I note that in experimental research, affect can be 
operationalized in two ways; relative to stimulus attributes (e.g., word valence), or 
individual differences in mood state (e.g., trait PA). However, these constructs are not 
independent, and both must conform to a biological framework.  
 In the second part of Chapter III, I provide rationale for the specific methods and 
hypotheses tested in Chapters IV, V and VI. I begin with an introduction to principal 
components analysis (PCA) in psychometric and neuroimaging research. I then provide 
rationale for the application of PCA to ERP analysis in the study of self-evaluative 
cognition. A challenge in this line of research is that several of the decision-making ERPs 
are superimposed; they overlap in time and space. I propose that PCA will effectively 
separate these ERPs for a more accurate study of their unique significance. I briefly 
review research that has defined the functional significance of the following ERPs: P300, 
LPP, P1r & MFN. The current research contributes to this literature by providing a 
whole-brain context for these waveforms, which are typically studied in isolation.  
 I conclude this chapter with an introduction to three studies of self-evaluative 
cognition. I first introduce Study 1, which investigated self-evaluation in depression, at 
various levels of symptom severity. To better interpret findings in this clinical sample, I 
then developed a model of  “neurotypical” functioning with Study 2 and Study 3. In 
Study 2, I introduced an “other-evaluation” contrast in an effort to isolate neural indices 
of self-specific processing. I also address this goal in Study 3; participants engaged in 
both self-evaluation and a word categorization task. To conclude, I review the central 
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goals of this research and introduce hypotheses that are relevant to the chapters that 
follow. Specific methods and results of these studies are described in Chapters IV-VI. To 
avoid redundancy, however, I provide a general introduction here. 
 Part I: A Neuropsychometric Approach 
 Psychometric methods in ERP research. Neural self-regulation is achieved in 
the brain because inter-related control systems provide reciprocal motivation and 
constraint (Tucker & Luu, 2012; Waters & Tucker, 2013a). Some brain functions are 
biased by internal need states, such as hunger or loneliness. Other systems are more 
responsive to the external environment; sensory experiences that are discrepant, 
surprising or threatening. A control-systems model of frontal lobe self-regulation posits 
that at the core of each of these systems is a source of affective-arousal: PA and NA, 
respectively.   
 The concepts of PA and NA, however, are derived from psychometric research. 
They are, by definition, latent factors that together describe much of the subjective, 
emotional experience (Watson & Tellegen, 1985). In research and practice, psychometric 
questionnaires are used to measure the status of these latent factors in individuals. For 
example, the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS), presents ten words that 
are highly and specifically related to PA and NA, respectively (Watson et al., 1988) 
(Table 1). The average endorsement across each set of ten words provides an estimate of 
affective arousal bias in individuals; PA and NA summary scores. According to a control-
systems model of neural self-regulation, this latent factor structure of mood also reflects 
trends in brain activity. I hypothesized that, just as word items on the PANAS 
questionnaire reflect PA and NA, aspects of the EEG signature could be identified as 
highly and specifically related to each mood dimension.  
 To test this hypothesis, I developed a neuropsychometric approach to EEG 
analysis in which average ERPs would reflect affective arousal bias in brain activity. I 
hypothesized that PA and NA would be related to dorsal cortico-limbic and ventral 
cortico-limbic systems, respectively. This approach captures variance in single trials that 
is typically lost in brain imaging research. The neurpsychometric method is among 
several recent developments in single trial analysis (Waters, Song, Luu, & Tucker, 2012). 
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Table 1  
PANAS Word Items and Loading Scores on PA and NA 
 Loading Scores  
PANAS  
descriptor 
Positive  
Affect 
Negative  
Affect 
 
Enthusiastic .75 -.12  
Interested .73 -.07  
Determined .70 -.01  
Excited .68 .00  
Inspired .67 -.02  
Alert .63 -.10  
Active .61 -.07  
Strong .60 -.15  
Proud .57 -.10  
Attentive .52 -.05  
Scared .01 .74  
Afraid .01 .70  
Upset -.12 .67  
Distressed -.16 .67  
Jittery .00 .60  
Nervous -.04 .60  
Ashamed -.12 .59  
Guilty -.06 .55  
Irritable -.14 .55  
Hostile -.07 .52  
Note: Adapted from (Watson et al., 1988) 
 
 Psychometric weighting of single trials. The neuropsychometric approach is a 
combination of psychometric and event-related potential methods. Psychometrics 
measure a latent construct as the average of responses across several closely related 
items. The average score is a more stable representation of the latent construct. In ERP 
research, measures of EEG amplitude are also averaged over many (sometimes hundreds) 
of trials. The average ERP is a more stable representation of the neural response to an 
event because individual trials contain a lot of variation that may be unrelated to the 
experiment. The fluctuating voltage in an average ERP waveform represents electrical 
events that are time-locked to the stimulus.  
 ERP methodology can be even more closely aligned with psychometrics. The 
self-evaluation task used in the current research closely resembles a standard 
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psychometric assessment. On each trial, the participant is presented with a word (e.g., 
brave) and must rate the extent to which the word is self-descriptive. In total, 150 
descriptor words were selected for the experiment. Two psychometric properties of each 
word stimulus were calculated using factor analysis; PA and NA loading scores. Loading 
scores quantify the extent to which a word item represents a latent factor (e.g., Table 1). 
The advantage of having this information in ERP research is that the single trial 
representation of PA and NA can also be quantified. 
 As if generating a trait affect summary score, I weighted single trials of the self-
evaluation task by their loading on the dimensional constructs of interest, PA and then 
NA (Figure 1). This neuropsychometric technique could be used for the study of any 
dimensional system, including models of personality and intelligence. It is more 
compelling, however, to test a two-dimensional model of affective arousal (i.e., mood) 
because there is evidence that these constructs also reflect a fundamental aspect of brain 
functioning (Tucker & Luu, 2012; Waters & Tucker, 2013a). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic of neuropsychometric approach to ERP analysis. Loading scores of 
word stimuli are used to weight single trials of EEG data. Single subject averages are 
constructed from weighted, single trials. In the grand average reflects the central 
tendency of the psychometric construct.  
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 Weighted averages show the time course of mood-cognition interaction. As 
The first demonstration of the neuropsychometric approach was conducted on a large 
sample of children and adolescents, ages 9-19 (Waters & Tucker, 2013b). The children 
engaged in a psychometric task during EEG recording. On each trial, they rated a single 
word adjective as like me or not like me. Responses were provided in less than one 
second. Importantly, each trial involved a word stimulus that was characterized with PA 
and NA loading scores. Single subject averages were then constructed from PA- and NA-
weighted trials, such that two grand averages each reflected the central tendency of a 
mood dimension. The developmental nature of this sample was incidental, and may even 
have complicated the results. The large sample size, however, was appropriate to test a 
novel method. 
 Overall, the NA-weighted ERP was of greater amplitude (Waters & Tucker, 
2013b), as if the neural mechanisms of a self-evaluative decision are dominated by NA 
bias. Distinction between weighted ERPs appeared 300 ms after the word was presented, 
coincident with the medial frontal negativity (MFN) ERP. This separation persisted 
through the decision-making epoch (Figure 2). This time course is consistent with 
research showing the interaction of emotional attributes and cognitive operations begins 
at later stages of the decision-making epoch (Poulsen et al., 2009; Scott, O‚ÄôDonnell, 
Leuthold, & Sereno, 2009; Tucker, Luu, Desmond, et al., 2003; L. A. Watson, Dritschel, 
Obonsawin, & Jentzsch, 2007).  
 Estimating the cortical activity from PA- and NA-weighted averages. The 
weighted averages were further decomposed using neural source analysis, or inverse 
modeling. This statistical technique estimates and visualizes the cortical sources of 
electrical activity recorded on the scalp surface (Scherg, 1990). Source analysis provides 
anatomical information allowing for comparison of results with metabolic brain imaging 
techniques. Importantly, this transformation informs anatomical models of brain function 
on the timescale of cognitive events. For this analysis, I parsed the cortex into large 
divisions reflecting Brodmann areas. This strategy provided conservative source models 
that estimate cortical information within the spatial resolution of the technique.  
 
 27 
 
Figure 2. Topographic maps of PA- and NA-weighted ERPs and statistical difference. 
Topographical maps of weighted ERP amplitude and statistical difference. Left column: 
color scales for ERP amplitude (top) and p-values associated with t-test statistical 
comparison of PA- and NA-weighted average ERPs (bottom). Top row: pairs of 
topographical maps (PA-weighted on left, NA-weighted on right) of average ERP 
amplitude on the scalp surface (nose to the top of the page). Bottom row: topographic 
arrangement of t-statistics on the head surface showing statistical comparison of PA- and 
NA-weighted ERPs at each recording channel. (1) P1: 100-200 ms, (2) P2/N1: 200-250 
ms, (3) MFN/P1r: 300-400 ms, (4) LPC/LIAN: 700-900 ms. 
 
 Using the neurosychometric approach, differences in PA-and NA- weighted 
averages made a surprising pattern not seen on the scalp surface (Waters & Tucker, 
2013b). This pattern differentiated an anterior-ventral phenomenon from a posterior-
dorsal phenomenon (Figure 3).  In anterior-ventral sources, PA- and NA-weighted  
source waveforms diverged at 400 ms and rose to a sharp peak by 850 ms. In dorsal 
posterior sources, the distinction began later, at 600 ms.  The dorsal waveform also rose 
to a broad, rounded maximum by 750 ms. Although both systems showed a larger effect 
of NA, differences in wave shape and time course suggested complementary networks 
functioning within the decision making epoch. The anterior network showed effects of 
affect earlier than the posterior network, and showed a rapid engagement starting at 600 
ms. The posterior network, in contrast, showed a gradual increase starting at 400 ms, and 
gradual decline from peak intensity. Though highly speculative, the two systems share 
attributes with fast and slow learning systems (i.e., experience dependent neural 
encoding) in the ventral cortical-limbic and dorsal cortico-limbic anatomy, respectively. 
 The neuropsychometric approach makes both theoretical and methodological 
contributions to the ERP literature. First, the analytic method places emphasis on 
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variance in single trials; it allows researchers to make use of single-trial variance within 
an averaged ERP design. Second, it presents the time course of neural source activity in 
the form of Brodmann area waveforms. This combines the temporal resolution of ERP 
with adequate spatial resolution to test network models. Finally, results of this initial 
analysis suggested a role for affective dimensions in network models of brain function. 
Although hypotheses were aimed at some of the more classically studied ERP 
waveforms, the neural source results suggest network level differentiation of PA and NA 
bias.    
 
 
 
Figure 3. Source waveforms in selected Brodmann areas (BAs). NA-weighted in bold, 
PA-weighted are stippled.  
 
 
 Future directions for the neuropsychometric approach. In the 
neuropsychometric analysis, affective experience was operationalized relative to 
properties of the word stimulus. These stimulus attributes are estimated using population-
level means. The technique is thus better aligned with a standard experimental design 
used to investigate effects of word valence (i.e., pleasant or good words; unpleasant or 
bad words). This dichotomous valence contrast, however, collapses all stimuli into two 
categories. All bad words, for example, are treated as if they are equally bad, which is not 
a valid assumption. For those studies aimed at better understanding the neural response to 
emotional stimuli, important variance is lost using this standard approach. The 
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neuropsychometric approach may be more precise in weighting single trials according to 
a quantified association with the attribute of interest (e.g., valence).  
 More importantly, PA and NA concepts better align experimental stimuli with 
constructs that occur in nature (i.e., in the brain). Although words can be understood 
conceptually on valence and arousal dimensions, the neural structure of mood is better 
aligned with the affective-arousal rotation, PA and NA. Perception of affect must 
conform to the perceiver’s system of making meaning; there is no “bad word” without a 
perceiver to make the judgment. The structure of mood bias in the perceiver determines 
the affective qualities assigned to a stimulus. This points to what may be a conceptual 
limitation of both the neuropsychometric approach and the standard experimental design; 
both characterize stimulus attributes independent of the perceiver. In the study of mood-
cognition interaction, it follows, there are at least two ways to operationalize affective 
experience; affective attributes of stimuli and individual differences in mood state. A 
future direction for the neuropsychometric approach will be to personalize weighting 
statistics to an individual’s trait mood. A goal would be to characterize patterns of 
variance in single trials that differ from a population mean as a function of an 
individual’s mood state.  
 In the experiments described below, both stimulus attributes (i.e., word valence) 
and individual differences in mood state (i.e., trait PA and NA) were applied to an 
investigation of mood-cognition interaction. In Study 1, variance in depressive symptom 
severity was used to identify neural correlates of mood-cognition interaction. Study 2 and 
Study 3 provided a model of “neurotypical” functioning to serve as context for 
dysfunctional deviation. Across all studies, I identified network features in the average 
ERP. In the section that follows, I describe an analytic approach to that goal using 
principal components analysis. I then derive specific hypotheses from a review of 
previous ERP research on self-evaluative cognition and decision-making. 
Part II: Principal Components Analysis in Event-Related Potential Research 
 From average ERPs to principal components. Results from the 
neuropsychometric analysis suggested that the decision-making ERP could be viewed 
within a neural systems framework. The presence of distinct features in the source 
waveforms implied a ventral-anterior component and a dorsal-posterior component. To 
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further explore this hypothesis, I again borrowed from psychometric methodology. Factor 
analytic strategies have been previously used to elucidate the latent, dimensional structure 
of mood. I proposed that the latent factor structure in EEG might elaborate on evidence of 
network dynamics in the decision-making ERP. To derive latent factors from variance in 
EEG data, I applied principal components analysis (PCA) to the average ERP. 
 PCA is a statistical approach to data reduction. Variables in complex data can be 
summarized with a smaller number of latent factors, or principal components. 
Mathematically, a component is a set of weights derived from the patterns of covariance 
between correlated variables. Conceptually, PCA groups the variables that show similar 
patterns of change. For example, in the case of a 100-word survey, a subset of words 
shows a high level of covariance (e.g., distressed, upset, guilty). Observed together, these 
words represent a latent factor, which in this example is NA. In temporal PCA with ERP 
data, the variables are not words but time points at which a measure was taken on the 
scalp surface. The data is not composed of responses to the questionnaire, but samples of 
EEG amplitude. At each time point, covariance is derived from three sources: between 
subjects, between conditions and between electrodes. The latent factor structure of the 
average ERP provides a summary of correlated neural events. 
 Self-evaluative cognition in ERPs. In Chapters IV-VI, I report on three separate 
studies in which I used PCA to explore the latent factor structure of the self-evaluative 
ERP. In Study 1, I compared results obtained from depressed and non-depressed adults. 
In Study 2 and Study 3, I developed a neuro-typical model with data obtained from two 
separate samples of undergraduate participants. Each of the studies in this series provided 
a unique source of variance for the components analysis. In Study 1, a range of 
depression pathology was represented within the sample; from mild (or absent) to 
frequent and severe. In Study 2, participants also engaged in an other-evaluation task, 
wherein they evaluated a public figure. Study 3 also included a contrast condition; 
participants categorized the descriptor words according to their semantic meaning. To 
avoid redundancy in subsequent chapters, I will provide background context for this 
series of experiments in the sections that follow. Drawing from this literature, I present a 
series of hypotheses that guide the more exploratory aims of this research.   
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 P300 and the maintenance of self-schema. The decision-making ERP can be 
roughly divided into a series of wave shapes. These aspects have been labeled, often 
according to onset time, and the behavior of each is typically studied in isolation. The 
first wave shapes in the decision-making epoch reflect an initial, visual response (e.g., 
visual P100, N1, frontal P200). This sensory response can be modulated by attention and 
a variety of stimulus attributes, but is relatively stereotyped (L. A. Watson et al., 2007). I 
instead begin this review with posterior ERPs that have been previously associated with 
mood, or stimulus valence (e.g., P300, LPP) (G. Hajcak, MacNamara, & Olvet, 2010). 
These ERPs have also been implicated in the neural basis of self (Fields & Kuperberg, 
2012; Herbert, Herbert, Ethofer, & Pauli, 2011; Herbert, Pauli, & Herbert, 2011; Liu, 
Sheng, Woodcock, & Han, 2013; Tucker, Luu, Desmond, et al., 2003; L. A. Watson et 
al., 2007; Zhang, Guan, Qi, & Yang, 2013).  I then review evidence that an anterior ERP, 
the medial frontal negativity (MFN), reflects the initial interaction of affect and cognition 
(Tucker, Luu, Desmond, et al., 2003; Waters & Tucker, 2013b; L. A. Watson et al., 
2007). 
 Many average ERPs appear distinct, but actually reflect the sum of constituent 
waveforms; a superimposition of different neural events. One such ERP appears in 
posterior channels, starting at 150 ms in the decision-making ERP. This “posterior 
positivity” represents the superimposition of at least three ERP events: P1 reprise (P1r), 
P300 and the parietal slow wave, or late positive potential (LPP). A combination of these, 
typically P300 and LPP are also described as the late positive complex (LPC). Previous 
research has explored the behavior of these ERPs in the context of emotional decision-
making (G. Hajcak et al., 2010).  
 The P300 is generally associated with the motivational salience of an event, as 
well as memory encoding (Donchin & Coles, 1988; J Polich, 2007). Early investigations 
showed that the P300 is enhanced when target stimuli are detected within a series of non-
targets (Courchesne, Hillyard, & Galambos, 1975). The P300 is also enhanced for 
emotional stimuli, such as frightening scenes or joyful faces (Lang, Nelson, & Collins, 
1990). These effects only occur, however, when a person is paying attention to the task 
(Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1977). Furthermore, the stimulus must carry information 
that is relevant to one’s motivation for attending (e.g., target detection). In other words, 
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the P300 response occurs within the context of an initial motivational bias (Bradley et al., 
2003). 
 The P300 is commonly associated with memory encoding because it is enhanced 
following stimuli that are later remembered (Donchin & Coles, 1988). However, ERP 
research shows that cognitive operations are spread out in time. Thus, cognition is 
redefined as an ongoing process instead of a discrete event. Similarly, neural encoding 
associated with the P300 is better understood within a cognitive operation; one that 
begins with a predictive schema, and ends with adjustments to that schema. Donchin and 
Coles (1988), described these adjustments associated with the P300 as context updating. 
In the context of self-evaluative decisions, it may be an aspect of the self-schema that is 
updated following appraisal events. Indeed, the LPC is larger when people evaluat 
themselves or a close friend, compared with reading (Poulsen et al., 2009; Tucker, Luu, 
Desmond, et al., 2003). The LPC is also larger when a trait word is endorsed as like me, 
rather than rejected, particularly when the word reflects a socially desirable characteristic 
(Poulsen et al., 2009; L. A. Watson et al., 2007). This suggests that P300 encoding might 
be related to the positive self-evaluation bias that is consistently demonstrated in self-
report measures. 
 Neural schema, memories or context-updating all reflect experience dependent 
learning. The P300 appears most related to the slow learning system of the dorsal cortex 
(Waters & Tucker, 2012). The dorsal limbic core is centered on the hippocampus and 
includes the classic Papez circuit, which includes posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). Some 
evidence links the P300 to activity in the PCC (Waters & Tucker, 2013b), as well as the 
phasic action of the norepinephrine system that innervates that region (Nieuwenhuis, 
Aston-Jones, & Cohen, 2005). Abnormalities in these aspects of the dorsal system, 
including attenuated P300 amplitude, are associated with depression and various other 
psychiatric disorders (Polich, 1998; Poulsen et al., 2009). Notably, P300 reactivity is 
relatively stable across time, suggesting that this ERP indexes trait-like aspects of the 
decision-making ERP (Walhovd, Rosquist, & Fjell, 2008). 
 The LPP and motivation to self-regulate. The late positive potential (LPP) 
follows the classic P300 in the posterior positivity. Depending on the experimental 
design, the LPP can endure for seconds beyond the decision-making epoch. The LPP is 
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larger following emotional or arousing stimuli, relative to neutral stimuli (MacNamara, 
Foti, & Hajcak, 2009). Like the P300, the LPP is stable in individuals over multiple 
recordings and there is some evidence that LPP reflects trait-like individual differences in 
motivation bias (Codispoti, Ferrari, & Bradley, 2007). For example, LPP is larger for 
objects that an individual desires, including those related to addiction in persons 
diagnosed with substance abuse. Individuals with a specific phobia show an enhanced 
LPP when exposed to the object of their fear, (G. Hajcak et al., 2010). Unlike the P300, 
notably, the LPP does not habituate after multiple presentations of a stimulus (G. Hajcak 
& Nieuwenhuis, 2006). This suggests that the motivational bias represented in the LPP 
may be more general, and less tied to a particular event than the P300. 
 When a stimulus is rapidly masked, the stereotyped visual ERPs remain intact, 
while the LPP is nearly absent (Whalen et al., 1998). This suggests that the LPP is 
present with conscious awareness of an event. Consistent with this observation, the LPP 
is attenuated when a person attempts to decrease a negative emotional response (Moser, 
Hajcak, Bukay, & Simons, 2006). Furthermore, self-reported changes in mood following 
intentional emotion regulation correlates with moderation of the LPP (G. Hajcak & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2006). Given this evidence, LPP is thought to index intentional and 
automatic emotion regulation, in the context of trait-like motivational biases.   
 The P1 reprise is involved in re-entrant processing of a visual stimulus. A less 
studied feature of posterior positivity is its earliest aspect, the P1r, which peaks between 
250 and 400 ms following stimulus onset. The P1r appears as bilateral foci, a topography 
that resembles the P100, which is an aspect of the early visual response (Tucker, Luu, 
Desmond, et al., 2003). This “reprise” of the visual P100 may provide some information 
about the functional significance of the P1r. The time course of the P1r is coincident with 
the MFN, which appears in anterior channels and has been implicated in complex 
processing of a visual stimulus. Evidence from this topography and time course 
combined suggests that the P1r is an index of re-entrant visual processing that follows the 
engagement of frontal lobe. The P1r is sometimes right lateralized in emotional tasks, 
including those that engage specialized functions of the left hemisphere, such as reading 
(Waters & Tucker, 2013b). The P1r may also reflect additional processing of emotional 
information, a specialization of the right hemisphere.  
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 The MFN detects events that are discrepant with predictions. The medial 
frontal negativity (MFN) is among a suite of negative going ERP components that 
emerge from activity in medial frontal cortices. The medial negativies reflect an 
exaggerated fronto-limbic response to a salient or discrepant event, self-observed errors 
or negative feedback, including negative self-evaluation (P. Luu, Flaisch, & Tucker, 
2000; Tucker, Luu, Desmond, et al., 2003). The MFN appears in anterior channels 
between 250-450 ms, coincident with the P1r waveform in posterior channels.  
 The MFN is consistently identified as the first appearance of emotion-cognition 
interaction (Fields & Kuperberg, 2012), including divergent effects of mood 
dimensionality (Waters & Tucker, 2013b). Tucker et al. (2003) provided a detailed 
description of effects in medial frontal electrodes during self-evaluation. Authors 
reported that by 300 ms, the MFN was greater in response to bad words than good word, 
particularly over the right frontal lobe. Within 50 ms of this valence effect, there was an 
interaction of valence and endorsement, such that the MFN was largest for negative-self 
appraisal events. This is the earliest reported effect of endorsement, suggesting that it the 
appraisal decision is made (though not executed) within the MFN epoch.  
 Importantly this enhancement of the MFN on negative appraisal trials was 
observed during self-evaluation, but not during the evaluation of a close friend (Tucker, 
Luu, Desmond, et al., 2003). It is as if the negative self-appraisal event is sufficiently 
salient in reference to the self and dissonant with internal self-schema. The MFN may 
reflect adaptive self-regulatory functions of the frontal limbic-cortex that are biased by 
negative affect (Tucker & Luu, 2007). However, the MFN appears exaggerated in people 
with high anxiety and trait negative affect (P. Luu et al., 2000). In clinical populations, 
the negative bias indexed in MFN reactivity might represent a disruption of implicit 
forms of self-regulation that contributes to maladaptive thinking. 
 Exaggerated MFN in negative-self appraisal trials was not, however, observed in 
depressed individuals (Poulsen et al., 2009). Instead, the MFN was attenuated when bad 
trait words were endorsed, relative to endorsed good words. The authors suggest that in 
depression negative self-appraisal may be congruent, not discrepant, with dysfunctional 
expectations (i.e., self-schema). Exaggerated MFN has also been shown in moderate 
depression following negative feedback, which is aligned with the experience of negative 
 35 
self-appraisal (Tucker, Luu, Frishkoff, Quiring, & Poulsen, 2003). Importantly, this effect 
attenuated as symptom severity increased, suggesting that the frontal lobe mechanisms of 
self-regulation might show a non-linear relationship with symptom severity.  
 In summary, exaggeration in the MFN can be associated with an anxious, 
negative affective bias. In severe depression, the MFN response attenuates with symptom 
severity. Attenuation in the posterior positivity, particularly the P300, can be associated 
with depression (low PA). It is possible that the MFN decreases in severe depression as 
co-morbid symptoms of anxiety fade. It may be that co-morbid anxiety in mild to 
moderate depression is an adaptive response to hypoactivity reflected in the P300. 
Testing this hypothesis may require methods of analysis that assess the relationship 
between anterior and posterior ERPs. Although frontal lobe mechanisms are more 
directly associated with self-regulation, the study of emotional decision-making with 
ERP typically reflects posterior brain responses. In the following section, I introduce 
three studies designed to characterize covariance between ERP waveforms over both 
anterior and posterior cortices. This series of experiments investigates evidence of 
network reciprocity in latent structure of the self-evaluative ERP.    
Part III: Introduction to Study 1, 2 and 3 
 Self-evaluative cognition in mild, moderate and severe depression. Depression 
involves dysfunctional mood-cognition interaction that can be observed as low trait 
positive affect and a marked decline in positive self-evaluation bias. In Study 1, I 
investigated neural mechanisms of self-evaluative cognition as a function of this decline. 
Results were interpreted relative to a control-systems framework of neural self-
regulation. The sample included adult participants who reported symptoms of depression 
ranging from absent to severe. EEG was recorded while these depressed and non-
depressed persons engaged in a self-evaluation task; rating single word adjectives as like 
me, or not like me. As expected, positive self-evaluation bias was inversely correlated 
with depression severity. The effect was greatest, however, in a subgroup of moderate to 
severely depressed individuals. This finding suggested that as depression grows more 
severe, negative self-evaluative cognition is more closely tied to an individual’s symptom 
profile.  
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 A secondary goal of this research, it follows, was to identify frontal lobe activity 
that showed a non-linear relationship with negative self-evaluation and symptom 
severity. I proposed a theoretical hypothesis that as depression grows more severe, there 
may be a categorical shift in the self-regulatory dynamic of the frontal lobe. In this sense, 
depression is distinct from transient sadness, which may be adaptive following loss. I 
investigated this hypothesis by first developing models of neural source activity in 
selected areas of the cortex (i.e., Brodmann areas). I then conducted an exploratory 
correlation analysis between neural source intensity, a measure of symptom severity and 
a measure of self-evaluation bias. Using this approach, I also addressed a tertiary aim of 
this study; to test the hypothesis that neural correlates of PA are right lateralized, while 
correlates of NA are left lateralized.   
 The central line of inquiry in Study 1 involved the application of principal 
components analysis to the decision-making ERP. I hypothesized that the latent factor 
structure might capture features of affect biased, reciprocal control systems in the frontal 
lobe. More specifically, I predicted that factors might recreate dorsal-posterior and 
ventral-anterior networks evidenced using a neuropsychometric approach. As this was a 
novel application of PCA methodology, Study 1 analyses were guided by the ERP 
features previously identified as relevant to affect-cognition interaction. For example, I 
hypothesized that the PCA would deconstruct the posterior positivity into three factors 
(P1r, P300, LPC) and predicted that latent factor associated with the P300 ERP would be 
attenuated in depressed participants.   
 Neurotypical self-evaluation. Both the neuropsychometric analysis and Study 1 
involved special populations (i.e., developmental; clinical). With Study 2 and Study 3, I 
sought to characterize effects in a “neurotypical” sample, screened for anxiety and mood 
disorders. This effort was undertaken to provide a necessary contrast with clinical or 
developmental samples. The central line of inquiry in Study 2 and Study 3 was an attempt 
to replicate the time course and topography of the component structure observed in Study 
1. I further hypothesized that the latent factors have a functional significance relative an 
affective-arousal model of neural self-regulation.  
 To explore this hypothesis, I developed two experimental contrasts. The 
implementation of contrast conditions also addressed a limitation of the Study 1. 
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Although I identified neural correlates of evaluation bias in Study 1, I could not conclude 
that these processes were specific to self-focused cognition. In Study 2 and Study 3, I 
address this limitation with the addition of two contrast conditions. In Study 2, I adapted 
the self-evaluation task to include a second condition in which participants evaluated a 
public figure. In Study 3, participants engaged in self-evaluation as well as a semantic 
categorization task. The addition of these contrast conditions was an effort to isolate the 
neural activity that is most directly related to self-processing. 
 Self-specific neural processing has been investigated with ERP methodology 
using a variety of experimental strategies. A frequent approach involves reading pronoun-
noun pairs that indicate whether a given stimulus is self-relevant, or relevant to someone 
else (Herbert, Herbert, et al., 2011; Herbert, Pauli, et al., 2011; Walla, Duregger, Greiner, 
Thurner, & Ehrenberger, 2008; Zhou et al., 2013). Another non-evaluative approach to 
self-reference involved cued recall of self-specific memories (Magno & Allan, 2007). 
One study used a self-evaluation task that involved reading phrases (Fields & Kuperberg, 
2012). At least two studies measure self-processing in the time frequency domain, instead 
of with an ERP approach (Knyazev, Savostyanov, Volf, Liou, & Bocharov, 2012; Mu & 
Han, 2010). Several studies are aligned with the current experimental design, but do not 
include a contrast of self- and other-reference (Poulsen et al., 2009; Waters & Tucker, 
2013b; L. A. Watson et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2013).  
 To the best of my knowledge, only three ERP studies have contrasted self-
evaluation with other-evaluation (Esslen, Metzler, Pascual-Marqui, & Jancke, 2008; Liu 
et al., 2013; Tucker, Luu, Desmond, et al., 2003). This is surprising given the productive 
and growing use of this paradigm in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
research. Unlike the ERP literature, metabolic measures of self-processing have 
coalesced on a network of brain areas, particularly along the midline, that consistently 
differentiate self- from other-evaluation (Craik et al., 1999; D'Argembeau et al., 2005; 
Heatherton et al., 2006; Johnson et al., 2002; Kelley et al., 2002; Kennedy & Courchesne, 
2008; Ochsner et al., 2005; Pauly, Finkelmeyer, Schneider, & Habel, 2013; Pfeifer, 
Lieberman, & Dapretto, 2007; Sarsam et al., 2013; Seger, Stone, & Keenan, 2004). These 
include the posterior cingulate and medial parietal lobe; ventral and dorsal medial 
prefrontal cortex. Notably, these regions also contribute source electrical activity to the 
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MFN and posterior positivity on the scalp surface. However the timescale of ERP and 
fMRI effects does not align. Whereas midline ERPs appear before 500 ms, metabolic 
effects are measured on the timescale of seconds.  
 Both Esslen et al., (2008) and Liu et al., (2013) reported a difference between 
self- and other-evaluation related to dorsal-medial prefrontal cortex (self>other). Esslen 
et al. (2008), derived this result by averaging the ERP over 700 ms of the decision-
making epoch. Liu et al., (2013) report their finding specific to the LPP time window in 
anterior channels (500-700 ms). Tucker et al., (2003) also report an effect of reference 
along central midline channels as the MFN transitioned into an anterior positivity (475-
525 ms). This effect reflected greater magnitude for the negative self-appraisal in self-
reference, but not other reference. Both Esslen et al., (2008) and Tucker et al., (2003) 
asked participants to select a close friend for the other-evaluation condition. In Liu et al., 
(2013), participants evaluated a famous athlete. Previous studies have used political 
figures (Craik et al., 1999; Kelley et al., 2002; Sarsam et al., 2013). Seeking to replicate 
the robust frontal effect reported in two of the three previous studies, I developed a 
contrast for Study 2 that involved the evaluation of a distant other, President Barack 
Obama.  
 In an attempt to further exaggerate self-reflection in the decision-making epoch in 
Study 2 and Study 3, I also adapted the response options. In Study 1, participants had a 
dichotomous response option (like me; not like me) and the decision-making task was 
speeded; participants would receive a warning if responses were slower than 800 ms. In 
Study 2 and Study 3, I expanded the response options to a four-point scale. I also cued 
responses 1 s. after the presentation of the word stimulation. This forced lengthening of 
response times, and opportunity for more nuanced responding, was intended to intensify 
self-reflective processing in the decision-making epoch. 
 For Study 3, I developed a novel contrast condition in which participants engaged 
in a semantic categorization task. This task was identical to the self-evaluation task, in all 
ways but instruction. Participants instead categorized the word stimuli as either an 
emotion descriptor or a personality trait. Emotion and personality were opposite poles of 
a dipolar continuum so that response options would involve a four-point scale, as in the 
self-evaluation condition. The categorization task in Study 3 was designed as an 
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alternative to other “semantic” control conditions, such as counting letters in the word or 
identifying the font case (e.g., Kelley et al., 2002). These controls are problematic for two 
reasons. First, responses are dichotomous and potentially more automatic than those 
provided in the self-evaluation task. Second, when performing these tasks, participants do 
not process semantic information. A third type of “semantic” control task asks 
participants to rate the valence or pleasantness of a word stimulus (e.g., Liu et al., 2013). 
When later asked to describe their strategy, many participants report that their valence 
judgment with made with implicit social comparison. The categorization task, instead, 
maintains the semantic and evaluative processes, but evokes less social comparison.  
 Mood dimensionality in self-appraisal behavior. The model of neural self-
regulation proposed by Tucker & Luu (2012) posits two affective-arousal biased control 
systems. Functions of the dorsal corticolimbic system are motivated by positive affect; 
functions of the ventral corticolimbic system by negative affect. Complex human 
behavior, including cognition, emerges from the reciprocal dynamic of these control 
systems. Stable biases (i.e., subtle dominance of one system over another) in neural 
behavior contributes to trait-like characteristics. Individual differences in trait mood, it 
follows, reflects this neural organization.  
 Poulsen et al., (2009), observed that trait PA and trait NA were uniquely 
predictive of self-evaluative behavior in a sample of depressed and non-depressed adults. 
PA predicted endorsement patterns in response to good words, only. NA predicted 
responses to bad words, only. The neuropsychometric sample also showed this 
dimensional specificity in evaluative behavior (Waters & Tucker, 2013b). The finding, 
and its replication, was interpreted as evidence for dimensional specificity in mood 
constraint on self-appraisal behavior. The broader implication is that depression (i.e., low 
PA) is associated with the rejection of good things, while anxiety (i.e., high NA) is 
associated with the acceptance of bad things. Symptom profiles are consistent with this 
hypothesis. Depressive behavior is characterized by apathy and inaction, while anxious 
behavior involves hyper-attentiveness to threats (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994).   
 Across all studies in the current research, I tested the hypothesis that mood 
constraint on self-evaluative cognition shows dimensional specificity. In parallel with this 
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behavioral hypothesis, I explored neural dimensionality in the self-evaluation ERP. 
Overall, this research considered how latent factors in EEG data might reflect network 
dynamics in the brain. Each study in the series modulated the factor structure with a 
unique source of variance. In Chapter IV-VI, I outline methods and analyses and provide 
results. Each chapter begins with an brief overview of the rationale and hypotheses and 
ends with a brief summary of results, specific to each study.  
 Beginning with Chapter IV, I review a study that captured variance in depressive 
symptom severity. This variance was used to identify network functions disrupted by a 
loss of positive affect. In Chapter V, I review a study that tested the hypotheses in a non-
clinical sample. This study also included a contrast between self- and other-evaluation. I 
used this contrast to identify features of the component structure enhanced by self-focus. 
In Chapter VI, I review a third replication of the factor analysis. This study introduces a 
second contrast condition that involved categorization of word stimuli. This contrast was 
used to identify factors that are modulated by the social context of evaluative decisions. 
Chapter VII provides a synthesis of the results across all studies, including the 
neuropsychometric approach, within a control-systems framework of neural self-
regulation. I conclude with speculation on the functional nature of latent components in 
the self-evaluative ERP, as well as the application of neural network measures to the 
study of psychopathology. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SELF-EVALUATION IN DEPRESSION 
 A transient decrease in positive self-appraisal may co-occur with sad mood (J. D. 
Brown & Mankowski, 1993; Mor & Winquist, 2002). In clinical depression this decrease 
is lasting and exaggerated (Rimes & Watkins, 2005). The act of self-evaluation engages 
frontal cortico-limbic mechanisms of emotion regulation, but it remains unclear how 
these normal constraints on cognition become pathological in depression. In the analysis 
that follows, I investigated changes in neural electrophysiology during self-evaluation as 
a function of symptom severity. The goal of this research was to elaborate on a control-
systems model of frontal lobe dysfunction in depression.  
 I constructed event-related potentials from EEG that was recorded as depressed 
and non-depressed individuals endorsed (or rejected) adjectives as self-descriptive. I 
hypothesized that participants would show a positive self-evaluation bias, but that this 
bias would be reduced in depression. I also tested a dimensional specificity hypothesis 
that posits trait positive and negative affect to be uniquely predictive of responses to 
socially desirable and undesirable words, respectively. 
 To test a model of network dysfunction in the cortex, I decomposed the average 
ERP into latent factors, using principal components analysis (PCA). I also used neural 
source analysis to estimate electrical activity in selected Brodmann areas of the cortex. I 
then identified neural correlates of self-appraisal bias and depressive symptom severity. I 
also divided the sample into two groups, based on high and low symptom profiles, and 
identified between group differences in the EEG signature. 
 The factor structure of the self-evaluative ERP has not been well characterized 
and the functional significance of latent factors is unknown. I hypothesized that the factor 
analysis would separate superimposed ERPs over the posterior cortex into three 
constituent waveforms. Following results of the neuropsychometric study (Waters & 
Tucker, 2013b), I predicted that the component waveforms would separate features of a 
dorsal-posterior and ventral-anterior network. Consistent with previous research (Polich, 
1998), I further hypothesized that the component associated with the classic P300 ERP 
would be attenuated in depression.  
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Methods and Materials 
The experiment was previously conducted at Electrical Geodesics, Inc. and the 
University of Oregon. Investigators generously made the raw data available for further 
analysis. 
 Participants. Participants (N=150) were recruited from the communities of 
Eugene and Springfield, Oregon. Subsequent analyses excluded participants with active 
substance abuse or dependence, as well as previous or current experience of psychotic 
symptoms, bipolar disorder, or neurological disorders. Participants were also excluded 
who reported current use of medication for the treatment of a mood or anxiety disorder. 
In total, 21 participants were excluded from the subsequent analysis. Inclusionary criteria 
included corrected to normal vision and English language fluency. Participants received 
$30 in remuneration.   
 Procedure. The study was conducted according to protocol and practice approved 
by the institutional review boards of Electrical Geodesics, Inc. and the University of 
Oregon. Each participant provided informed consent and then completed a series of 
questionnaires, including: Beck Depression Inventory; BDI (A. Beck, Steer, & Brown, 
1996), Hamilton Depression Inventory; HDI (Williams, 1988), and the Oregon Self 
Concept Inventory (Tucker, Luu, Desmond, et al., 2003). EEG data were recorded while 
participants performed a self-evaluation task. The experimental session was completed in 
approximately two hours. 
 Experimental task. The self-evaluation task required participants to read a single 
word adjective, such as brave or guilty, on a computer screen and indicate whether or not 
the word was self-descriptive (Figure 4). The 209 word stimuli represented both socially 
desirable and undesirable personality characteristics (i.e., good words and bad words). 
The participant provided their answer by pressing a button with their right or left index 
finger (counterbalanced across participants) to indicate whether the trait is like me or not 
like me. A single trial of the self-evaluation task proceeded as follows: fixation cross 
hatch (“+”) (2000 ms), word stimulus (500 ms), blank screen (1000 ms or when response 
is given). Word presentation was grouped in four blocks. Task stimuli and response 
recording was controlled by E-Prime Software, Version 1.2.1.795 (Psychology Software 
Pittsburgh, PA). 
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 EEG preprocessing. The EEG recording was made through a Net Amps 200 
amplifier and Net Station software (Electrical Geodesics, Eugene, Or). The data was 
segmented into 1200 ms epochs, including a 200 ms pre-stimulus baseline. Non-EEG 
artifacts were detected and removed from the analysis using the Fully Automated 
Statistical Thresholding for EEG artifact Rejection (H. Nolan, R. Whelan, & R. B. Reilly, 
2010). Single subject averages were re-referenced to the average reference. A grand 
average was also constructed for descriptive analyses. 
  
 
 
Figure 4. Stimulus presentation in Study 1. 
 
 
Statistical Decomposition 
 Principal components analysis (PCA). The PCA was conducted with the ERP 
Toolkit, version 2.32 (Dien, 2010), using all single subject averages (n=128). A Promax 
rotation was used with a covariance relationship matrix and a Kaiser weighting. In this 
“temporal” PCA, time points are variables, analogous to items on a psychometric survey. 
Following decomposition into components, data were transformed back to the original 
scale (i.e., micro volts) by multiplying factor scores by the factor loadings for each time 
point (by channel by subject). The resulting waveform and scalp topography reflects the 
portion of the single subject ERP accounted for by each component. 
 Neural source analysis. A second decomposition strategy modeled electrical 
activity in selected cortical regions. Cortical tissue volume and location were estimated 
using the Montreal Neurologic Institute (MNI) MRI atlas. Skull conductivity was 
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estimated from an X-ray computed tomography (CT) image that was registered with the 
MNI atlas. A finite difference forward model (FDM) of head shape and conductivity 
allows cortical grey matter to be parsed into 7 mm “voxels,” or electrical dipoles 
(GeoSource 2.0 software; EGI, Eugene, OR). Current density in a single dipole was 
represented as the sum of vectors for three dimensions. Standardized low resolution brain 
electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) constrained projections in the lead field. This 
parameter choice, coupled with a strong regularization constant (Tikhonov: 1 X 10-2), 
represented a conservative (i.e., low-resolution) approach to source localization. Regions 
of interest were developed by grouping dipoles in large swaths of cortex. These “source 
montages” corresponded to twenty-three Brodmann areas (BAs) per hemisphere.  
Statistical Analyses 
 Group differences in demographic and psychometric measures. I calculated a 
Percent Negative Self-Evaluation (PNSE) statistic to reflect the percent of trials in which 
the participant endorsed an undesirable word as like me, or rejected a desirable word. I 
used Pearson’s correlation analysis to assess the linear relationship between PNSE and 
BDI scores. When necessary, BDI and PNSE scores were transformed to normal. I also 
used one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to determine statistical differences 
between high BDI (BDI≥10) and low BDI (BDI<10) groups on a number of variables: 
BDI, HDI, PNSE, age, and years of education. 
 Group differences in EEG amplitude. I used one-way Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) to assess statistical differences in mean amplitude between high BDI 
(BDI≥10) and low BDI (BDI<10) groups. The ANOVA compared mean amplitude 
values at the peak time point of each component. No statistical correction was made for 
multiple comparisons. Instead, the coherent spatial organization of effects observed on 
the head surface is a guide to effects that survive multiple comparisons (Tucker, Liotti, 
Potts, Russell, & Posner, 1994).  
 Correlation analysis. I conducted a series of correlation analyses to characterized 
linear associations between BDI scores, appraisal behavior and source intensity in 46 
BAs. Normality of all variables was assessed using a Shapiro-Wilk test. Non-normal 
variables were transformed to normal and assessed with a parametric correlation strategy 
(Pearson’s r). In some cases, non-parametric correlation strategies were used (i.e., 
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Spearman’s Rho). Correlation analyses were repeated on the sample divided into two 
groups (i.e., high BDI, low BDI). Statistical significance of the correlation coefficient 
was assessed using a t-distribution. In this, the t-statistic is calculated as the ratio of the 
correlation coefficient to the standard error of the coefficient in the sample. The null 
hypothesis states that the correlation coefficient is not statistically different from zero. A 
post-hoc analysis also tested the significance of non-linear trends in two pairs of 
variables. One-way ANOVA was used to test for group mean differences in two BA 
sources.  
Results 
 Behavioral and demographic characteristics. BDI and PNSE appear positively 
correlated in a non-parametric test, rs(129)=.585, p<.001, and when transformed to 
normal r=.605, p<.001. An inflection point observed in the scatterplot instructed the 
subsequent between groups analysis. A quadratic model added to this prediction (Figure 
5), R2=.417, ΔR2=.06, F(2,126)=46.7, p<.001, 95% CI [.29, .54]. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Correlation of % negative self-evaluation and scores on the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI). 
 
 Participants were divided into two groups, high BDI (BDI≥10) and low BDI 
(BDI<10). Of 129 participants included in the analysis, 51 (24 male) were classified in as 
high BDI and 78 were classified as low BDI (32 male). Groups were statistically 
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equivalent in age, p=.913 and years of education, p=.157. On average, individuals in the 
high BDI group engaged in more negative self-evaluation (35.5%), than did individuals 
in the low BDI group (21.3%). The high BDI group also reported greater symptom 
severity on the HDI, F(1, 127)=139.66, p<.001. A one-way ANOVA conducted on 
transformed-to-normal PNSE scores confirmed a statistical difference between group 
means, F(1,127)=39.761, p<.001. A main effect of valence was also significant, 
F(1,127)=9.34, p= .003. Overall, more yes-to-bad trials contributed to the negative self-
evaluation statistic. An interaction of group and valence was not significant.  
 
 
Table 2 
Demographic and Clinical Characteristics in Study 1 
 
 High BDI (n=51) Low BDI (n=78)    
Measure  
M 
 
SD 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
df 
 
F / χ2 
 
p 
BDI 18.91 8.4 4.98 2.78 1, 127 184.95 <.001 
HDI 21.12 8.45 7.73 4.25 1, 127 139.66 <.001 
Age 26.08 9.17 25.88 10.22 1, 127 .012 ns 
Education 14.6 2.06 15.27 2.86 1, 127 2.031 ns 
PPSE 35.5% 14.6 21.3% 11.7 1, 127 37.17 <.001 
Gender 24 Male  32 Male  3 .457 ns 
Note. Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), Hamilton Depression Inventory (HDI), Age (in 
years), Education (in years), Percent Positive Self-Evaluation (PPSE) reflects the 
frequency of endorsed good words and rejected bad words. Between groups statistical 
assessment: One way ANOVA (BDI, HDI, Age, Education, PPSE), Pearson chi-square 
test (Gender). Not significant (ns, p>.05). 
 
 
 
 Means (with standard deviations) for trait positive and negative affect in the low 
BDI group were 37(5), and 19(6), respectively. Means for trait positive and negative 
affect in the high BDI group were 33(7), and 24(7), respectively. PA was positively 
correlated with the endorsement of good words and bad words, rs (129)=.523, p<.001; 
rs(129)=.185, p=.032, respectively. NA was inversely correlated with the endorsement of 
good words and bad words, rs (129)=-.327, p<.001; rs (129)=-.531, p<.001, respectively 
(Table 3). 
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Table 3 
Correlation of Trait Affect and Self-Evaluative Behavior in Study 1 
Individual Difference Measure 1 2 3 
    
1. Positive Affect (PA) --   
2. Negative Affect (NA) -.175* --  
3. Percent yes to good words .523** -.327** -- 
4. Percent no to bad words .185* -.531** .795** 
    
n=129  *p<.05, **p<.001 
 
 
 Average event-related potential. The visual P1 appears as bilateral foci and 
broadly across posterior channels between 100-150 ms following stimulus onset (Figure 
6). It peaks at approximately 130 ms and appears greater in channels over the right 
hemisphere. The visual N1 appears as bilateral foci and broadly across posterior channels 
between 150-260 ms following stimulus onset. Amplitude reaches a minimum at 
approximately 185 ms. The frontal P2 appears between 155-300 ms following stimulus 
onset. It peaks at approximately 210 ms. The frontal P2 is highly left lateralized in this 
sample, extending into channels over the left temple. The medial frontal negativity 
(MFN) appears between 300 and 460 ms, also left lateralized in anterior channels. 
Amplitude reaches a minimum at approximately 360 ms. The magnitude of the MFN 
appears larger in the high BDI group.  
 The late positive complex (LPC) appears over parietal cortices between 240 and 
825 ms. Visual inspection of the LPC waveform suggests three overlapping components. 
The first could be described as the posterior P2 or a P1r. It appears between 240-400 ms 
following stimulus onset with bilateral topography similar to the P1. It is strong over 
right parietal channels, particularly for the high BDI group, and is nearly absent over the 
left hemisphere. A second feature of the LPC appears between 400-680 ms. Its posterior 
parietal topography is roughly consistent with the classic P300 ERP. A third feature of 
the LPC, most consistent with the late positive potential (LPP), appears between 680-825 
ms. It is distributed broadly over the parietal lobes, and reaches peak amplitude at 740 ms 
following stimulus onset. Figure 6 shows the average ERP for both high BDI and low 
BDI groups. 
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 Latent factor structure of the average ERP. Based on the results of a parallel 
test, seven components were retained from the ERP data, accounting for 89% of the total 
variance. Components 2-4 (C2-C4) accounted for three aspects of the late positive 
complex (LPC), each with distinct time course and topography (Figure 7). C2-C4 
accounted for 24%, 18% and 16% of the total variance, respectively. The remaining four 
components accounted for 13%, 8%, 6% and 4% of the total variance, respectively. 
 C3 is the largest component (24% of the variance). Time samples that loaded 
highly on this component fell between 300-760 ms following stimulus onset. The 
component reached peak magnitude at 540 ms. The topography of C3 reflected features 
of the classic P300 positivity in posterior channels, in addition to a right lateralized 
frontal positivity. C2 (18% of variance) described an earlier component with prominent 
features between 190-540 ms following stimulus onset, and a peak magnitude at 320 ms. 
Topography of C2 reflected features of the MFN and an early aspect of the LPC (the P1 
reprise). C4 (16% of variance) appeared broadly over parietal cortex between 530-930 ms 
following stimulus onset. Of note was the peaked shape of the C4 waveform peak at 760 
ms. Topography was consistent with a late component of the LPC, the parietal slow wave 
or LPP. Components showing time course and topography consistent with the LPC (C2-
C4) were retained for subsequent between-groups analyses.  
 
_________________________________ 
 
Figure 6. (next page) ERP signature of self-evaluative cognition. Grand Average ERP 
(red = depressed, green = control), with a 200 ms baseline before stimulus onset. Black 
rectangle channel shown in Figure 7.   
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Figure 7. Decomposition of the posterior positivity in Study 1. Left: LPC at from a 
central parietal site (Pz) in Figure 4 shows grand average ERP (red = high BDI, green = 
low BDI), stimulus onset at vertical line. Right: Data decomposed into three principal 
components at Pz shown for the low BDI group. 
 
 
 Group differences in component amplitude. Relative to the low BDI group, 
high BDI participants showed attenuated loading on C3 over right frontal, left anterior 
temporal, and right parietal sites (Figure 8). In contrast, C2 was exaggerated in the high 
BDI group compared to low BDI participants, showing statistically significant 
differences over medial frontal and posterior sites. Component amplitude in C4 did not 
differ between control and depressed subjects. C4 was thus excluded from subsequent 
analyses. 
 Correlation of neural source activity and psychometric measures. In C3, no 
correlation coefficient was above the threshold for statistical significance. In C2, 
correlations with RBA32 (right anterior cingulate cortex) and LBA38 (left temporal pole) 
were above the statistical threshold. The magnitude of the RBA32 model was inversely 
correlated with BDI scores, rs(129)=-212, p=.016, and PNSE rs (129)=-210, p=.017. 
Transformed-to-normal, these relationships also appear using a parametric correlation 
strategy, r(129)=-.234, p=.008 and r(129)=-.228, p=.009, respectively. LBA38 was also 
inversely correlated with PNSE scores, rs(129)=-.206, p=.014. Transformed to normal, 
parametric statistics maintain this association, r(129)=-.238, p=.007). No correlation 
analyses were conducted with C3 variables because between-group differences were not 
detected on the scalp surface. 
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Figure 8. Topographic maps of grand average amplitude for three components. White 
circles identify statistically significant group mean differences. In C2, these differences 
reflect greater magnitude in the high BDI group. In C3, these differences reflect greater 
magnitude in the low BDI group. 
 
 
 A between-groups, means comparison was conducted, post hoc, on RBA32 and 
LBA38 in C2. Levine’s test for homogeneity of variance indicated equal variance in the 
transformed RBA38 data, p=.071. Mean differences in LBA38, however, were not 
significant, p=.429. Equal variance could not be assumed in the transformed RBA32 data, 
p=.014. An independent samples t-test, adjusted for unequal variance in samples, was not 
significant, p=.118.  
 Neural correlates of negative self-evaluation (PNSE). In C3, RBA47 (right 
ventral lateral prefrontal cortex; RVLPFC) in the high BDI group was inversely 
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correlated with negative self-evaluation, r(51)=-.313, p=.025. This effect was not 
observed in the low BDI group. Instead, RBA19 (right secondary visual cortex) in the 
low BDI group was inversely correlated with negative self-evaluation, rs (78)=-.316, 
p<.005. This association was replicated with a parametric correlation on transformed-to-
normal data, r(78)=-.287, p=.011. This effect was not observed in the high BDI group. 
 In C2, RBA47 (right ventral lateral prefrontal cortex; RVLPFC) in the high BDI 
group was again inversely correlated with negative self-evaluation, rs(51)=-.339, p=.015. 
This association was replicated with a parametric correlation on transformed-to-normal 
data, r(51)= -.338, p=.015). This effect was not observed in the low BDI group. Instead, 
LBA38 (left temporal pole) in the low BDI group was inversely correlated with negative 
self-evaluation, rs(78)=-.272, p=.016). This association was replicated with a parametric 
correlation on transformed-to-normal data, r(78)=-.231, p=.042). 
 Neural correlates of depressive symptoms. In C2 RBA47 was inversely 
correlated with BDI, rs(51)=-.352, p=.011 in the high BDI group. In C3, RBA38 (right 
temporal pole) in the high BDI group was inversely correlated with BDI scores, r(51)=-
.293, p=.037. The low BDI group showed a different pattern of effects in C2: RBA47 
(right ventral lateral prefrontal cortex; RVLPFC) was positively correlated with BDI. In a 
post hoc regression analysis on the full sample (n=129), a quadratic model was 
statistically significant, R2=.06, F(2,126)=4.05, p=.02, 95% CI [-.01, .14] (Figure 9). 
Summary of Results 
 What follows is a brief summary and interpretation of Study 1 results. In Chapter 
VII, I will provide a broader synthesis of results and discuss the implications of the 
findings across studies.   
 Behavioral results. As expected, the positive self-evaluative bias declined with 
increased severity of depressive symptoms. In more severe depression, scores on the 
symptom checklist predicted a sharper decline in positive self-evaluation. The observed 
inflection point in the behavioral data suggests a hypothesis that cognitive processes in 
severe depression might be different from the experience of transient symptoms. Based 
on these behavioral results, I speculated that participants with high BDI scores (i.e., 
depressed) may be more withdrawn. For these individuals, mood and evaluative 
cognition may be more constrained to internal processes (i.e., self-schema). In contrast, 
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participants with low BDI scores might be more engaged with the world external to 
themselves, which contributes noise to the self-evaluative profile on the day of testing.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Right ventral lateral prefrontal cortex (RVLPFC) activity and symptom 
severity. x-axis: Beck Depression Inventory summary scores; y-axis: standardized 
measure of current density in the right BA47 (VLPFC). Right panel: BA47 dipole 
montage. 
 
 
 The dimensional specificity hypothesis, predicting patterns of mood constraint on 
cognition, was supported by the findings. Although both PA and NA scores predicted 
evaluative responses, a special association of PA with good words and NA with bad 
words was apparent in the effect size of the correlation statistics. Extrapolating from this 
finding, depression may involve more rejection of positive events, while anxiety may 
involve more acceptance of negative events. Future research might test the 
generalizability of the hypothesis beyond the context of this self-evaluation task. 
 C2 is exaggerated in depression: C3 is attenuated in depression. Average EEG 
amplitude in high BDI group (i.e., depressed) differed significantly from the low BDI 
group (i.e., controls). As hypothesized the component that captured variance in the P300 
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ERP was attenuated in depression. Extrapolating from the P300 research, C3 
functionality might relate to stimulus encoding and the updating of neural schema 
following an emotional event. C3 topography also showed frontal cortical activity that is 
pathological in depression, but may only be observable with a factor analytic approach. 
C3 accounted for the largest amount of variance in the decision-making ERP. This may 
be significant because the distribution of depressive symptoms in the patient population 
(i.e., between-subject variance) contributed to the component structure. It appears that C3 
may be relevant to dysfunctional cognition in depression.  
 In contrast with C3, C2 was exaggerated in the high BDI group. Although this 
was not a predicted finding, it may be important for understanding comorbid anxious and 
depressive symptoms. C2 accounted for variance in the MFN and P1r of the average 
ERP. Consistent with hypotheses, effects of mood-cognition interaction (i.e., between 
group differences) were first detected in this time window. Extrapolating from MFN 
research, the C3 functionality may involve high order stimulus processing relative to 
encoded expectations, or schema. The MFN is exaggerated in highly anxious people. 
Notably, participants in this experiment showed clinically significant anxiety in addition 
to depressive symptoms. Future research might investigate linear relationships between 
neural sources in C2 and symptoms of anxiety.  
 Consistent with previous findings, components were differentiated by wave 
shape; rounded in C3 and pointed in C4. However the topography of these components 
was not entirely consistent with the prediction. C4 showed no between-group differences 
and its topography was not suggestive of a ventral-anterior network. C3 showed some 
association with a dorsal-posterior network, however. Though speculative, the pattern of 
between-groups effects in C2 and C3 is more consistent with a control-systems model of 
frontal lobe self-regulation. This component structure reflects functions and affective 
biases of the dorsal-limbic system in C3, and ventral limbic system in C2. 
 Neural correlates of self-appraisal bias. In C2, the electrical activity in the right 
anterior cingulate cortex (BA32) and left temporal pole (BA38) declined with positive 
self-appraisal and increased symptoms severity. These findings are localized to regions of 
the cortex previously implicated in self-processing. However, the direction of the 
association is not consistent with the hypothesis. 
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 Although EEG amplitude in C2 was exaggerated in depression, activity in the 
right ventral lateral prefrontal cortex (RVLPFC) was inversely correlated with symptom 
severity in the depressed group. In C3, trends in the depressed and control groups 
diverged. In the depressed group, electrical activity in the RVLPFC and right temporal 
pole (BA38) decreased as positive self-appraisal bias declined and symptom severity 
increased, as in C2. In the control group, this pattern was reversed; RVLPFC current 
density increased with more depressive symptoms. This quadratic association in C3 
suggests an inflection point consistent with the behavioral data.  
 Though highly speculative, it appears that in depression there is shift away from 
processing environmental phenomena to an inward focus. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, the neural correlates of appraisal bias are also detected in the right secondary 
visual area the low BDI group, but not in the high BDI group.  
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CHAPTER V 
SELF-EVALUATION AND OTHER-EVALUATION 
 Patterns of self-evaluation typically reflect a positivity bias (reviewed in Leary, 
2007). People tend to evaluate themselves more favorably than they do another person. 
Self-evaluative ratings are also higher than ratings provided by another person. Individual 
differences in mood state and self-esteem predict the extent of the positivity bias in self-
evaluation (J. D. Brown & Mankowski, 1993; Zhang et al., 2013). In clinical depression, 
however, the positivity bias is markedly decreased (Rimes & Watkins, 2005). In Study 1, 
I investigated this mood constraint on cognition as depressed and non-depressed 
individuals engaged in a self-evaluation task. Results of the ERP analysis showed 
depression-related attenuation and exaggeration at different stages of the decision-making 
epoch. In Study 2, the ERP signature of self-evaluation was characterized in a sample of 
non-depressed young adults. The goal of Study 2 was to develop a model of cortical 
functioning in the healthy brain that will provide a necessary contrast with results from 
Study 1. 
 Undergraduate participants were screened for subclinical levels of depression and 
anxiety. EEG was recorded as participants rated the extent to which a series of trait 
adjectives were self-descriptive, using a four-point scale. The experiment also included 
an other-evaluation condition, in which participants evaluated President Obama. The 
addition of this contrast condition addressed a limitation of the previous study; I could 
not conclude that effects were specifically related to self-processing. Previous 
applications of this contrast have shown midline effects in ERP amplitude: self- greater 
than other-evaluation (Esslen et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2013; Tucker, Luu, Desmond, et al., 
2003). 
 In Study 2, I operationalized affect in two ways: as the valence of word stimuli 
(i.e., desirable or “good;” undesirable or “bad”), and as individual differences in trait 
positive and negative affect. Effects of word valence were assessed in mean differences 
in EEG amplitude. I also assessed the linear relationship between trait mood and EEG 
amplitude. I tested the hypothesis that hemispheric mood bias is asymmetrical; correlates 
of trait PA are right lateralized and correlates of trait NA are left lateralized. In parallel 
with this electrophysiological hypothesis, I sought to replicate previous findings in the 
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behavioral domain. I tested the hypothesis that mood constraint on self-evaluative 
behavior shows dimensional specificity; PA is specifically predictive of responses to 
good words, while NA predicts endorsement of bad words.  
 In Study 2, principal components analysis (PCA) was used to deconstruct the 
average ERP into latent factors. Results of Study 1 demonstrated that the posterior 
positivity, known to be influenced by mood-cognition interaction, could be decomposed 
into three constituent waveforms. I hypothesized that this decomposition of a posterior 
ERP using PCA would be replicated in Study 2, and further implicate anterior activity in 
affect biased cognitive processing. Results of Study 1 suggested four components, or 
stages, of the decision-making epoch. An aim of Study 2 was to further characterize the 
functional significance of each component, with focus on the interaction of emotion and 
cognition in neural self-regulation. I hypothesized that the component reflecting variance 
associated with the P300 would show effects of reference over frontal midline. I further 
hypothesized that effects of stimulus valence would be associated with the component 
that captures variance in the MFN. The statistical approach taken in this research may 
provide a unique window into neural network functions in self-evaluative cognition. 
Methods and Materials 
 Participants. Forty-one (12 male) undergraduates, 18-23 years old, participated 
in the study for class credit. Inclusionary criteria included; right handedness, English 
language fluency and normal or corrected to normal vision. Exclusionary criteria 
included diagnosis or treatment for any of the following conditions: Traumatic Brain 
Injury, loss of consciousness, concussion, or dizzy spells, Epilepsy or seizures, Attention 
Deficit Disorder (ADD or ADHD), a neurological condition, Encephalitis, polio or other 
medical conditions with symptoms relating to brain function.  
 Procedure. Participants provided informed consent and were then fitted with a 
Geodesics Sensor Net (EGI, Eugene, OR). EEG was recorded as participants completed a 
self-evaluation task. Upon completion of the task, participants completed a series of 
questionnaires, including: Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; A. Beck et al., 1996), Beck 
Anxiety Disorder (BAI; A. T. Beck & Steer, 1990), Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule-X (PANAS; D. Watson & Clark, 1999) and a debriefing questionnaire. 
Participants were also given a test of explicit recall of descriptor words. The experimental 
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session was completed in approximately two hours. The study was conducted according 
to protocol and practice approved by the institutional review boards of Electrical 
Geodesics, Inc. and the University of Oregon. 
 Experimental task. Descriptor words (e.g., brave) were presented, one at a time, 
in white on a black computer screen (Figure 10). As each word was displayed, 
participants indicated the extent to which the word was self-descriptive by pressing one 
of four buttons (1-not at all like me; 4-very much like me). In a second condition, 
participants instead indicated the extent to which each word described a public figure, 
President Barack Obama. Trials began with a central fixation point ("+") for two seconds, 
followed by the word stimulus for .5 seconds, and then a blank screen for an additional 1 
second to allow for a response. Each of four blocks of trials lasted approximately four 
minutes. Condition order alternated with every participant and the direction of the scale 
alternated after every two participants.  Participants were allowed to rest between blocks. 
Task stimuli and response recording was controlled by E-Prime Software, Version 
1.2.1.795 (Psychology Software Pitsburgh, PA). 
 
 
Figure 10. Schematic of stimulus presentation in Study 2. Responses in two conditions 
were provided on a four-point continuum (bottom). 
 
 
 Task development. The self-evaluation task was adapted from Tucker, et al., 
(2003) with a number of changes. The dichotomous response was extended to a four-
point scale. Instead of providing an immediate response, participants were cued to 
respond 1 second after the word stimulus offset. The current study also included two 
conditions; self-evaluation and other-evaluation. Also, undergraduate students (n=71) 
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completed a brief survey in which they evaluated five public figures (e.g., Oprah 
Winfrey, Steve Jobs). Based on responding patterns and familiarity ranking, President 
Obama was selected for the survey. 
 Finally, a norming study of descriptive adjectives was conducted to select stimuli 
and devise categories of word stimuli that were balanced on attributes known to affect the 
ERP profile. Words were selected from the Oregon Self-Concept Inventory-II (OSCI-II; 
Tucker, Luu, Desmond, et al., 2003), PANAS-X and PANAS-C. In two separate surveys, 
undergraduate students rated the valence (n=788) and arousal (n=207) characteristics of 
each word stimulus. Response profiles were used to generate two categories of word 
stimuli (good and bad). 75 good words and 75 bad words were selected. The two 
categories of stimuli were balanced on the arousal dimension as well as word length and 
lexical familiarity.    
 EEG preprocessing. The EEG recording was made through a Net Amps 400 
amplifier and Net Station software (Electrical Geodesics, Eugene, Or). The data was 
segmented into 1200 ms epochs, including a 200 ms pre-stimulus baseline. Non-EEG 
artifacts were detected and removed from the analysis using the Fully Automated 
Statistical Thresholding for EEG artifact Rejection (H. Nolan, R. Whelan, & R. Reilly, 
2010). Nine subject files were eliminated from the analysis due to excessive non-neural 
signal in the recording. Trials were grouped into one of four categories, all reflecting 
positive appraisal. Categories reflected two level factors: reference type (self, other) and 
word valence (yes-good, no-bad). No-good and yes-bad trials were excluded from the 
analysis because there were too few to construct an ERP average. Single subject averages 
were re-referenced to the average reference. A grand average was also constructed for a 
descriptive analysis. 
Statistical Analyses 
 Behavioral and psychometric measures. Appraisal behavior was quantified as 
the percent of good (or bad) words endorsed across a four-point scale. Repeated measures 
Analysis of Variance (rmANOVA) tested for main effects of reference (self or other), as 
well as the two-way interaction of valence and endorsement, and the three-way 
interaction of valence, endorsement and reference.  
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 Appraisal behavior was summarized in three statistics: %-yes-to-good, %-no-to-
bad, and  % positive self-evaluation (PPSE), collapsed across word valence. Each of 
these statistics was calculated by reducing the four-point scale to a dichotomous response 
(like me; not like me). Trait affect was operationalized using the PA and NA scales on the 
PANAS survey. Correlation analyses will assess linear relationships between 
psychometric variables and appraisal behavior. 
 Principal components analysis (PCA). As in the previous chapter, statistical 
decomposition was conducted with the ERP Toolkit, version 2.32. A Promax rotation 
was used with a covariance relationship matrix and a Kaiser weighting. In this “temporal” 
PCA, time points are variables, analogous to items on a psychometric survey. Following 
decomposition into components, data were transformed back to the original scale (i.e., 
micro volts) by multiplying factor scores by the factor loadings for each time point (by 
channel by subject). The resulting waveform and scalp topography reflects the portion of 
the single subject ERP accounted for by each component. 
 Experimental contrasts in EEG data; valence and reference. Effects of 
experimental factors in EEG data (i.e., main effect of valence, main effect of reference, 
interaction of valence and reference) were characterized at each recording channel using 
a means contrast tool in Netstation software (EGI, Eugene, Oregon). At each channel, the 
average difference between two samples is compared with the standard error of that 
difference. The resulting statistic is assessed relative to a t-distribution. Results are 
visualized as the topographic arrangement of t-statistics on the head surface. The color 
palette reflects significance values (i.e., p-statistic). No statistical correction was made for 
multiple comparisons. The coherent spatial organization of t-statistics observed on the 
head surface is a guide to effects that survive multiple comparisons, similar to the logic of 
random field effects in fMRI research (Tucker et al., 1994). Following visual inspection 
of the t-test topomaps, post-hoc analysis of variance was conducted on selected channels. 
 Correlation analysis. Pearson’s r characterized linear associations between trait 
affect scores and selected recording channels. When Shapiro-Wilk test of normality were 
significant, non-parametric correlation strategies were used (Spearman’s Rho). These 
variables were also transformed to normal (classic logarithm) and further tested with 
parametric strategies. Statistical significance of the correlation coefficient was assessed 
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using a t-distribution. In this, the t-statistic is calculated as the ratio of the correlation 
coefficient to the standard error of the coefficient in the sample.  
Results 
 Self-evaluative behavior. On average, participants engaged in positive self-
evaluation on 72% (standard deviation:17) of trials and positive other-evaluation 
(President Obama) on 74% (22). These means were not significantly different, p=.362. A 
main effect of valence was also not significant; yes-to-good and no-to-bad trials 
contributed evenly to the positive appraisal bias. An interaction of reference and valence 
was significant, however, F(1,41)=11.9, p=.001. Simple effects showed positive 
evaluation of Obama involved rejection of negative words more than endorsement of 
positive words, t(42)=2.1, p=.039. 
 Positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) summary scores were inversely 
correlated, r(41)=-.393, p=.011. Positive self-evaluation inversely correlated with NA, 
r(41)=-.572, p<.001, but was positively correlated with PA, r(41)=.484, p=.001. Self-
evaluative responses to good words correlated with both NA and PA, r(41)=-.425, 
p=.006; r(41)=.423, p=.006. Self-evaluative responses to bad words also correlated with 
both NA and PA, r(41)=-.622, p<.001; r(41)=.465, p=.002.  
 Positive evaluation of Obama likewise correlated inversely with NA (r(41)=-.449, 
p=.003) but was not predicted by PA, p=.327. The dimensional specificity of NA in 
predicting responses to negative words was supported only in the comparison of effect 
sizes: bad words, r(41)=-.499, p<.001; good words, r(41)=-.364, p<.019. Table 4 
provides a summary of these results. 
 
Table 4 
Correlation of Trait Affect and Evaluative Behavior in Study 2 
Individual Difference Measure 1 2 
   
1. Positive Affect (PA) --  
2. Negative Affect (NA) -.393*  
3. Percent like me to good words .423* -.425* 
4. Percent not like me to bad words .465* -.622** 
5. Percent like Obama to good words .140 -.364* 
6. Percent not like Obama to bad words .146 -.499** 
n=41  *p<.05, **p<.001 
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 Average event-related potential. The grand average ERP is shown in Figure 11. 
The visual P1 appeared as bilateral foci in posterior channels between 100-150 ms 
following stimulus onset. Peak amplitude at approximately 125 ms appeared greater in 
channels over the right hemisphere, as in the previous study. As the posterior positivity 
swept into anterior channels, the visual N1 appeared as bilateral foci in posterior channels 
between 150-225 ms. N1 amplitude reached a minimum at approximately 200 ms. As in 
the previous sample, it was left lateralized. The frontal P2 appeared between 200-270 ms 
and peaked at approximately 227 ms. Consistent with previous results, the frontal P2 was 
highly left lateralized, extending into channels over the left temple. The medial frontal 
negativity (MFN) appeared between 280 and 460 ms. In contrast with previous results, 
MFN topography appeared right lateralized in this sample. MFN amplitude reached a 
minimum at approximately 325 ms. A superimposed complex of positive going waves 
appeared over parietal cortices at 270 ms through end of the window selected for analysis 
(1.2 seconds). Visual inspection of the LPC waveform suggests three overlapping 
components. This waveform may have included the P1reprise (P1r; 270-340), the P300 
(350-450ms) and the late positive potential (LPP; 470-end). The LPC appeared larger in 
the self-evaluation condition in contrast with other-evaluation. The MFN also appeared 
more robust in the self-evaluation condition, particularly in right anterior channels.  
_________________________________ 
 
Figure 11. (next page) ERP signature of evaluative cognition in Study 2. The grand 
Average ERP (blue=self-evaluation, red = other-evaluation) is 1 s. long following a 200 
ms baseline before stimulus onset (vertical line). 
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 Latent factor structure of the average ERP. Based on the results of a parallel 
test, seven principal components were retained from the ERP data, accounting for 91% of 
the total variance. The topography and time course closely replicated the component 
structure observed in the previous analysis. A difference between the two studies, 
however, is seen in the extent to which individual components account for different 
amounts of variance. A consequence of this difference is that the components appeared in 
different orders across studies. To avoid confusion, I will retain the labels (C1, C2 and 
C3) as a reference to a component with characteristic topography and time course, while 
factor (F1, F2, F3) refers to the order of components in a given study. Factors 1-3 (F1-F3) 
accounted for three aspects of the late positive complex (LPC), each with distinct time 
course and topography (Figure 12). F1-F3 accounted for 36%, 20% and 18% of the total 
variance, respectively. Variance explained by components 4-7 (F4-F7) was: 8%, 4%, 3%, 
2%. 
 C1 (F4) was the forth largest component (8%). C1 appeared earliest in the 
decision-making epoch (140-290 ms) and was maximal at 230 ms. C1 captured variance 
related to the stereotyped visual ERPs: posterior N1 and P1, anterior P2. As in the 
average ERP, the anterior positivity extended into left ventral lateral channels. In 
previous analyses, only components showing time course and topography consistent with 
the LPC (C2-C4) were retained for subsequent analyses.     
 C2 (F2) was the second largest component (20% of the variance). The topography 
and time course of F2 closely resembled C2 in Study 1; a posterior positivity and anterior 
negativity between 200-550 ms that peaked at 350 ms. Topography of C2 reflected 
features of the MFN and an early aspect of the LPC (the P1 reprise). Of note was the 
asymmetrical pattern in anterior ventral lateral channels; positivity on the left and 
negativity on the right. In contrast with the previous analysis, the C2 waveform was more 
peaked than rounded. 
 C3 (F3) was the third largest component (18% of the variance) and it closely 
resembled the C3 component from the previous analysis. C3 was maximal between 400-
800 ms and peaked at 600 ms. The topography of C3 reflected features of the classic 
P300 positivity in posterior channels. An anterior positivity observed in the previous 
study was notably absent.  
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  C4 (F1) was the largest component (36% of the variance). The topography and 
time course of F1 closely resembled C4 in Study 1; a broad positivity over parietal cortex 
starting at 500 ms. C4 also captured variance related to the parietal slow wave, or late 
positive potential (LPP), observed in the average ERP. However, C4 differed from 
previous findings in that it also included an anterior positivity and the waveform had a 
rounded shape that appears to extend beyond the analytic time window.    
 
 
 
Figure 12. Decomposition of the posterior positivity in Study 2. Left: LPC at from a 
central parietal channel 119 (Pz). Blue=self-evaluation; red=other-evaluation. Right: Data 
decomposed into three principal components at channel 119 (Pz) shown for self-
evaluation, only. 
 
 
 Effects of reference type and word valence in component amplitude. A main 
effect of reference type was observed across all three components (C2-C4), over central 
midline and in the right ventral lateral anterior channels (Figure 13). The central midline 
effect (self > other) fell just below a threshold for statistical significance, except for a 
focus over the parietal midline, p=.06. The right ventral lateral anterior effect (self more 
negative than other) was spatially coherent in C2 and neared statistical significance, 
p=.057.   
 Main effects of word valence were more varied across components C2-C4. In 
both C3 and C2, the right ventral lateral anterior negativity was greater for good trials, 
F(1,31)=12.4, p=.001, η2=.286; C3: F(1,31)=9.7, p=.004, η2=.239. The effect was most 
robust and coherent in C2. Also in C2 and C3, there was a trend toward greater positivity 
over left superior temporal lobe and greater negativity over left ventral temporal lobe, in 
bad word trials. Midline and right posterior channels, in contrast, showed greater 
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positivity in good word trials. For C3, this effect was statistically significant over parietal 
midline, F(1,31)=5.8, p=.022, η2=.158, and showed a trend over the frontal midline. In 
C2, this midline and right posterior effect was not statistically significant, p=.080. C4 
effects of valence diverged from this pattern. In C4, good trials showed greater positivity 
in anterior channels, F(1,31)=8.1, p=.008, η2=.206 ,while bad trials showed greater 
positivity in left posterior channels, p=.066. 
 The interaction of reference and valence was not statistically significant in C2-C4. 
A digital estimate of the topography beyond sensor locations suggests an interaction in 
ventral frontal pole. The topographical distribution of component amplitude suggests an 
interaction effect in the midline negativity, which appears diminished in the self-good 
trials. Consistent with this observation, the topography of t-statistics shows a coherent 
effect in midline channels. The effect is not statistically significant.  
 Neural correlates of trait affect. Effects of reference and word valence were 
asymmetric in anterior ventral lateral channels of C2 and C3. A correlation analysis 
investigated the relationship between trait affect and EEG amplitude. A montage of 
channels was selected based on the topography of statistical effects in previous analyses. 
Statistically significant correlations were found over the right hemisphere, but not over 
the left hemisphere. Right anterior effects appeared more robust for PA, than NA. PA 
was inversely correlated with amplitude, reflecting an increase in right ventral negativity 
with higher PA scores. This effect was observed in both C2 and C3 for other-evaluation, 
and only in C2 for self-evaluation (Figure 14). 
_________________________________ 
 
Figure 13. (next page) Effects of reference and valence in component amplitude. A. 
Topographic plots of component amplitude (red=positive, blue=negative) on the scalp 
surface (nose pointing up). B. Topographic plot of t-statistics at each channel (p-value 
noted in color palette).   
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A post hoc repeated measures analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was used to further 
assess effects in the right ventral negativity. The model included two factors, reference 
(self, other) and component (C2, C3), as well as two covariates, NA and PA. The 
between subjects effect of PA was significant, F(1,31)=9.99, p<.003, indicating that 
higher PA was associated with greater negativity in both C1 and C2. The between 
subjects effect of NA was not significant, p=.366. A component by PA interaction was 
also significant, F(1,31)=4.6, p=.039, indicating greater effects in C2 than in C3. The 
effect of component in self-reference observed in the correlation analysis (in C2 but not 
in C3) was not reflected in the results of the ANCOVA. 
 
 
Table 5 
Correlation of Trait Affect and Amplitude Over Ventral Lateral Prefrontal Cortex 
Measure 1 2 
   
1. Positive Affect (PA) --  
2. Negative Affect (NA) -.393*  
3. C2 Amplitude, self-evaluation -.513** .300 
4. C3 Amplitude, self-evaluation -.230 .199 
5. C2 Amplitude, other-evaluation -.570** .358* 
6. C3 Amplitude, other-evaluation -.396* .245 
n=32  *p<.05, **p<.001 
 
 
 
Summary of Results  
 Dimensional specificity in evaluative behavior. A goal of this study was to 
characterize the relationship between mood and self-evaluative cognition in measures of 
decision-making behavior and brain activity. As expected, appraisal patterns showed a 
positive bias. I hypothesized that trait positive and negative affect scores would show 
predictive specificity, such that positive affect would predict responses to good words, 
and negative affect would predict responses to bad words. There is only subtle evidence 
of dimensional specificity in these results. Both PA and NA were highly predictive of 
endorsement behavior, with correlation statistics in the .4 range. The inverse relationship 
between NA and responses to bad words (i.e., percent no-to-bad) was much stronger, 
with effect sizes in the -.6 range.  
 69 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Correlation of PA and amplitude over ventral lateral prefrontal cortex. (Left) 
Schematic of EEG sensor net. green = channels included in the correlation analysis; black 
circle = RVLPFC montage used in reported statistical results, including scatterplots. 
(Right) Scatterplots showing correlation of EEG amplitude and PA in self-evaluation (left 
column), other-evaluation (right column), C2 (top row), C3 (bottom row). 
 
 
 
 Evaluation of the distant other, President Obama, also provides some evidence of 
dimensional specificity. In this sample, NA scores predict evaluations of the President 
whereas PA scores do not. It may be that the construct represented by NA reflects 
engagement with the social environment, while PA reflects something more related to the 
goals of the individual. This is consistent with a two-factor structure of personality in 
which the NA-like factor reflects social self-regulation, while the PA-like factor reflects 
dynamism in the individual (Saucier et al., 2014). On average, participants did not rate 
themselves more favorably than the President. This is contrary to research in this area 
that typically shows higher self-rating compared to evalutation of a close or distant other 
(Leary, 2007). Notably, positive appraisal of the President was populated by no-to-bad 
trials, while no-to-bad and yes-to-good trials were evenly represented in positive self-
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evaluation. It appears that these undergraduate participants are influenced more by NA 
(i.e., social self-regulation) than PA, when evaluating the President at the height of his 
popularity. 
 Components of the decision-making ERP. As hypothesized, the parietal 
positive complex was decomposed into three separate factors. The onset of each is 
coincident with the onset observed in the ERP. In order of onset: the P1r (C2), P300 (C3) 
and LPP (C4). ERP research has variously associated features of the posterior complex 
with decision-making behaviors and shown effects of trait affect as well as stimulus 
valence (G. Hajcak et al., 2010). An obstacle to interpretation of these effects is that the 
average ERP waveform represents a superposition of multiple processes over posterior 
cortices. The current results demonstrate that the posterior complex is reliably 
deconstructed into three components. In addition, the component topography shows 
anterior activity that is highly correlated with each posterior component. Because these 
latent factors represent non-overlapping electrical activity and account for the entire scalp 
surface, results are more amenable to interpretation relative to the mechanics of electrical 
brain function.  
 A subsequent goal of this research was to begin to characterize the functional 
nature of these components. I used experimental contrasts to identify affective and 
cognitive attributes in each component. I began with a hypothesis from the previous study 
that C3 (P300) would show effects of reference (self, other), and that C2 (P1r-MFN) 
would show effects of stimulus valence. Results, however, suggest a more complicated 
picture. 
 The self in component structure and amplitude. To understand the neural 
mechanics of self-evaluation in particular, I developed a contrast condition that was 
identical in every way but one: the person under evaluation. In ERP research the 
difference between self-evaluation and the evaluation of a close friend is very subtle. 
There is also evidence from brain imaging that as affiliation decreases, the distinction 
between self- and other-reference increases. I sought to exaggerate the difference 
between self and other by selecting a public figure that is known by most participants, but 
not closely affiliated with any of them. Despite this conceptual difference, the main effect 
of the contrast in component amplitude was subtle. Consistent with previous results 
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(Tucker, Luu, Desmond, et al., 2003), it was difficult to distinguish self from other 
reference in the electrophysiological signature of an evaluative decision. 
 Though below statistical threshold, mean differences between self- and other- 
reference (self>other) spanned the dorsal midline, with effects growing stronger over 
parietal cortex. This may reflect additional processing in the posterior cingulate cortex, 
and central midline structure (CMS). Self- was also more robust than other-evaluation 
over the right ventral lateral prefrontal cortex (rVLPFC). The effect is present in all three 
components, but statistically significant in C2 (P1r-MFN). Indeed, this is strongest 
observed effect of the contrast. In summary, effects of reference did not differentiate 
components. However, the midline trend (self>other) contextualizes the current effect 
among previous reports. In addition, the rVLPFC is implicated (self- more negative than 
other-reference), particularly in C2. It may be that the rVLPFC plays an important role in 
evaluative decision-making. 
 Affect-cognition interaction and a control-systems hypothesis. Results show 
effects of word valence in the electrophysiological signal. The pattern of results also 
differentiated the three components. In the latest component, C4 (LPP), good words 
evoked a larger positivity over the frontal midline, and bad words evoked a larger 
positivity in in left posterior channels. This interaction of valence and topography is 
particularly interesting given that C3 begins around 600 ms, likely after the evaluative 
decision has been made. Closer inspection of the component topography suggests several 
effects that might contribute to the posterior difference: lack of left posterior focality for 
other-good and the shape of the self-good focus over central midline. Although the 
interaction of valence and reference was not significant over left posterior channels, this 
observation is consistent with previous reports of greater LPP in self-reference and in 
response to positive stimuli. 
 The time course of C2, followed by C3, is more consistent with initial decision-
making processes. In both components, bad is more positive than good over left temporal 
lobe. This may reflect additional processing of negative stimuli in language systems of 
the lateral left hemisphere. In C3 (P300) good is more positive in posterior midline 
channels. This is consistent with numerous reports that show P300 larger for positive 
stimuli. The component topography, however, further implicates central and anterior 
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midline channels, suggesting that valence processing in CMS structures is uniquely 
captured in C3. In both C3 and C2, the negativity over right ventral lateral prefrontal 
cortex (RVLPFC) is once again implicated (good more negative than bad). As in the 
contrast of self and other, the RVLPFC is particularly robust in C2 (P1r-MFN). Taken 
together, C2, the earliest of the three components, appears to capture variance related 
mood-cognition interaction. 
 Differentiating frontal control systems in the component structure. A tertiary 
goal for this research is to elaborate on a control-systems model of frontal lobe function 
(and dysfunction). Statistical decomposition of the average ERP uses correlated neural 
activity to define a latent factor structure. The functional significance of that factor 
structure is unknown. According to the control-systems model, it is the dynamic 
reciprocity of limbic-cortical, dorsal-limbic and ventral-limbic systems, right and left 
hemispheres that gives rise to cognition (Tucker & Luu, 2012; Waters & Tucker, 2013a). 
Of note in the C2 and C3 topography is an asymmetric pattern of electrical potentials in 
lateral anterior channels. Consistent with a dimensional model of affect motivated control 
systems in the frontal lobe, I hypothesized that activity in the right hemisphere is biased 
by PA; while activity in the left is biased by NA. To test this hypothesis, I conducted a 
post-hoc analysis on the asymmetric activity in C2 and C3. PA was strongly and 
significantly correlated with amplitude in right but not left anterior ventral lateral 
channels. This effect appeared in both self- and other-evaluation and was more robust in 
C2. This result is consistent with the hypothesized model and further implicates RVLPFC 
in the affective processing during self-evaluation.  
 Further association of the latent factor structure with the hypothesized model is 
highly speculative. Features of C2 are more consistent with ventral limbic functioning. 
The experimental effects show activity related to stimulus processing in C2 and frontal 
effects are lateralized over ventral cortex. C2 captures variance related to the MFN and 
P1r, two average ERP waveforms that are associated with re-entrant, or higher order 
cognitive processing of a stimulus or event (P. Luu et al., 2000). In contrast, the 
topography of C3 and C4 is more dorsal in nature. C4, in particular, shows effects of 
stimulus processing over broad swaths of anterior and posterior dorsal cortex. C3 is 
associated with both midline and ventral lateral effects. Though not consistent with the 
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basic outline of a control-systems model, this association of C3 with central midline 
structures, as well as the classic P300 ERP, is suggestive of the central midline network 
implicated in self-processing (Qin & Northoff, 2011).  
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CHAPTER VI 
SELF-EVALUATION AND SEMANTIC CATEGORIZATION 
 The third study in this series was designed to replicate and build on the previous 
results. Young adult undergraduates engaged in a self-evaluation task while their EEG 
was recorded. In addition to the self-evaluation task, participants completed a semantic 
categorization task. This contrast condition was identical to the self-evaluation task in 
every way but instruction. In the categorization task, participants rated the extent to 
which each word described an emotion or a personality trait, presented as a bipolar scale. 
The contrast was used to identify self-specific processing in the decision-making ERP. 
 As in Study 2, this research was aimed at establishing a model of neurotypical 
brain function during self-evaluative cognition. Results may serve as a baseline contrast 
for research with clinical samples. A primary analytic goal of Study 3 was to assess the 
replicability of the component structure, time course and topography. Through replication 
of exploratory findings, Study 3 also contributed to the central goal of this research; to 
assess a network model of affective self-regulation in self-evaluative decision-making.   
 Hypotheses reflected these central goals, as well as the assumptions of an 
affective-arousal control-systems model. I hypothesized that positive-self appraisal bias 
would be predicted by measures of mood state. Specifically, there would be dimensional 
specificity in the predictive relationship such that PA will be associated with endorsement 
of good words, and NA with bad words. Extended to neural measures, I hypothesized that 
there would be dimensional specificity in hemispheric bias. In particular, I predicted that 
trait PA would correlate with activity over the right ventral lateral prefrontal cortex 
(RVLPFC), as seen in Study 2. Seeking to replicate the findings of Study 2, I predicted 
that statistical decomposition of the average ERP would separate the posterior positivity 
into three components. A goal of this investigation was to clarify the neural mechanisms 
of self-appraisal behavior, with particular focus on those that involve affective processes. 
This goal was approached with the characterization of mood and valence effects in 
component amplitude. Results were interpreted relative to an affective-arousal model of 
neural self-regulation. 
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Methods and Materials 
 Participants. Forty-three (14 male) undergraduates, 18-24 years old, participated 
in the study for class credit. Inclusionary criteria included; right handedness, English 
language fluency and normal or corrected to normal vision. Exclusionary criteria 
included diagnosis or treatment for any of the following conditions: Traumatic Brain 
Injury, loss of consciousness, concussion, or dizzy spells, Epilepsy or seizures, Attention 
Deficit Disorder (ADD or ADHD), a neurological condition, Encephalitis, polio or other 
medical conditions with symptoms relating to brain function.  ! Procedure. Participants provided informed consent and were then fitted with a 
Geodesics Sensor Net (EGI, Eugene, OR). EEG was recorded as participants completed a 
self-evaluation task. Upon completion of the task, participants completed a series of 
questionnaires, including: Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; A. Beck et al., 1996), Beck 
Anxiety Disorder (BAI; A. T. Beck & Steer, 1990), Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule-X (PANAS; D. Watson & Clark, 1999) and a debriefing questionnaire. The 
experimental session was completed in approximately two hours. The study was 
conducted according to protocol and practice approved by the institutional review boards 
of Electrical Geodesics, Inc. and the University of Oregon. 
 Experimental task. Descriptor words (e.g., brave) were presented, one at a time, 
in white on a black computer screen (Figure 15). As each word was displayed, 
participants indicated the extent to which the word was self-descriptive by pressing one 
of four buttons (1-not at all like me; 4-very much like me). In a second condition, 
participants decided to what extent each word described a personality trait or a mood 
state (1 - mood state, 4 - personality trait). Trials began with a central fixation point ("+") 
for 2 seconds, followed by the word stimulus for .5 seconds, and then a blank screen for 
an additional one second to allow for a response. Condition order alternated with every 
participant and the direction of the scale alternated after every two participants. Each of 
four blocks of trials lasted approximately four minutes. Participants were allowed to rest 
between blocks.  
 This self-evaluation task was adapted from Tucker, et al. (2003) and Study 2, in 
this series. Word stimuli were identical to those used in Study 2. Good word and bad 
word groups of 75 words each were balanced on several attributes; arousal, magnitude of 
 76 
valence, word length and lexical familiarity. Norming procedures are described in 
Chapter V. Task stimuli and response recording was controlled by E-Prime Software, 
Version 1.2.1.795 (Psychology Software Pittsburgh, PA). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Schematic of stimulus presentation in Study 3. Responses in two conditions 
were provided on a four-point continuum (bottom). 
  
 
 EEG preprocessing. The EEG recording was made through a Net Amps 400 
amplifier and Net Station software (Electrical Geodesics, Eugene, Or). The data was 
segmented into 1200 ms epoch; including a 200 ms pre-stimulus baseline. Non-EEG 
artifacts were detected and removed from the analysis using the Fully Automated 
Statistical Thresholding for EEG artifact Rejection (H Nolan et al., 2010). Seven subject 
files were eliminated from the analysis due to excessive non-neural signal in the 
recording. There were two experimental factors in the analysis: task and word valence. 
Trials were grouped into one of four categories: (self-evaluation, good; self-evaluation, 
bad; categorization, good; categorization, bad). Single subject averages were re-
 77 
referenced to the average reference. A grand average was also constructed for a 
descriptive analysis. 
Statistical Analyses 
 Behavioral and psychometric measures. Self-evaluative behavior was 
quantified as the percent of good (or bad) words endorsed on the four-point scale. This 
scale was collapsed to a dichotomous variable for statistical analysis. Repeated measures 
Analysis of Variance (rmANOVA) tested for main effects of valence, as well as the two-
way interaction of valence and endorsement. In a separate analysis, effects of word 
valence on semantic categorization behavior was assessed using rmANOVA.  
 Self-evaluative behavior was summarized in three statistics: %-yes-to-good, %-
no-to-bad, and an overall summary statistic, % positive self-evaluation (PPSE). Trait 
affect was operationalized using the PA and NA scales on the PANAS survey. 
Correlation analyses assessed linear relationships between psychometric variables and 
appraisal behavior. 
 Principal components analysis (PCA). As in the previous chapter, statistical 
decomposition was conducted with the ERP Toolkit, version 2.32 (Dien, 2010) . A 
Promax rotation was used with a covariance relationship matrix and a Kaiser weighting. 
In this “temporal” PCA, time points are variables, analogous to items on a psychometric 
survey. Following decomposition into components, data were transformed back to the 
original scale (i.e., micro volts) by multiplying factor scores by the factor loadings for 
each time point (by channel by subject). The resulting waveform and scalp topography 
reflects the portion of the single subject ERP accounted for by each component. 
 Experimental contrasts in EEG data; word valence and task type. Effects of 
experimental factors in EEG data (i.e., main effect of word valence, main effect of task, 
interaction of valence and task) were characterized at each recording channel using a 
means contrast tool in Netstation software (EGI, Eugene, Oregon). At each channel, the 
average difference between two samples is compared with the standard error of that 
difference. The resulting statistic is assessed relative to a t-distribution. Results are 
visualized as the topographic arrangement of t-statistics on the head surface. The color 
palette reflects significance values (i.e., p-statistic). No statistical correction was made for 
multiple comparisons. The coherent spatial organization of t-statistics observed on the 
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head surface is a guide to effects that survive multiple comparisons, similar to the logic of 
random field effects in fMRI research (Tucker et al., 1994). Following visual inspection 
of the t-test topomaps, post-hoc analysis of variance was conducted on selected channels. 
 Directed correlation analysis. Pearson’s r characterized linear associations 
between trait affect scores and selected recording channels over ventral lateral prefrontal 
cortex (Figure 16). When Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality were significant, non-
parametric correlation strategies were used (i.e., Spearman’s Rho). These variables were 
also transformed to normal (classic logarithm or square root) and further tested with 
parametric strategies. Statistical significance of the correlation coefficient was assessed 
using a t-distribution. In this, the t-statistic is calculated as the ratio of the correlation 
coefficient to the standard error of the coefficient in the sample.  
 
 
 
Figure 16. Channels selected for the correlation analysis.  
 
 
Results 
 Self-evaluative behavior. On average, participants engaged in positive self-
evaluation on 75% of trials. A main effect of valence was not significant; yes-to-good 
and no-to-bad trials contributed evenly to the positive appraisal bias. In the semantic 
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categorization task, participants more often classified words as a personality descriptor 
(57%) than a mood descriptor, F(1,41)=30.1, p<.001. The interaction of word valence 
and category was also significant as participants tended to classify bad words as mood 
states and good words as personality traits, F(1,41)=269.8, p<.001. 
 The median positive affect (PA) summary score was 36 (SD 5.5), and the median 
negative affect (NA) summary score was 20 (SD 4.3). PA and NA scores were not 
correlated with each other (p=.172). The median BDI score was 8, (SD=6.7) and the 
median BAI score was 7 (SD=7). BDI and BAI were highly correlated, rs(41)=.562, 
p<.001. NA was positively correlated with BDI, rs(41)=.363, p=.017, and BAI, 
rs(41)=.343, p=.025. An inverse correlation of PA and BDI neared significance, rs(41)=-
.298, p=.053.  
 There was dimensional specificity in the prediction of endorsement behavior 
(Table 6). PA was correlated with positive self-evaluation rs(41)=.514, p=.001) overall, 
and with the endorsement of good words, rs(41)=.325, p=.036, and rejection of bad 
words, rs(41)=.428, p=.001). NA was not correlated with self-evaluative behavior 
statistics. Neither BDI or BAI predicted self appraisal in general, but they did predict 
responses to bad words: BDI: rs(41)=-.447, p=.003; BAI: rs(41)=-.359, p=.018. 
 
 
Table 6 
Correlation of Trait Affect and Self-Evaluative Behavior in Study 3 
Individual Difference Measure 1 2 3 
    
1. Positive Affect (PA) --   
2. Negative Affect (NA) -.135 --  
3. Percent yes to good words .325* .051 -- 
4. Percent no to bad words .482** -.181 .410** 
    
n=41  *p<.05, **p<.001 
 
  
 Average event-related potential. Figure 17 shows the grand average ERP for 
self-evaluation and the categorization task. The visual P1 appeared as bilateral foci in 
posterior channels between 100-140 ms following stimulus onset. The P1 was strongly 
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right lateralized in this sample; peak amplitude at approximately 120 ms was minimal in 
left posterior channels. As the posterior positivity swept into anterior channels, the visual 
N1 appeared as bilateral foci in posterior channels between 150-300 ms. N1 amplitude 
reached a minimum at approximately 200 ms. As in the previous sample, N1 amplitude 
appeared greater on the left. The frontal P2 appeared between 195-240 ms and peaked at 
215 ms. Consistent with previous results, the frontal P2 was highly left lateralized, 
extending into channels over the left temple. The medial frontal negativity (MFN) 
appeared between 310 and 440 ms, and reached a minimum at approximately 400 ms. A 
superimposed complex of positive going waves appeared over parietal cortices from 260-
900ms. Visual inspection of the LPC waveform suggests three overlapping components. 
This waveform may have included the bilateral P1reprise (P1r; 270-445), the central 
P300 (450-550ms) and late positive potential or parietal slow wave (LPP; 550-900). The 
P1r appeared to transition into the P300 earlier in self-evaluation. In semantic 
categorization, MFN also appeared more negative in the self-evaluation condition, 
particularly in right anterior channels. In the second half of the epoch, a left lateralized, 
anterior positivity appeared greater for self-evaluation than semantic categorization. 
 Latent factor structure of the average ERP. Based on previous findings, a 
seven-factor structure was retained from the ERP data, accounting for 92% of the total 
variance. Notably, results of a parallel test suggested that a six-factor structure would 
account for a similar amount of variance. The topography and time course closely 
replicated the component structure observed in the previous analysis (Figure 19).  
 C1 was the fourth largest component (9%). C1 was the earliest component (380-
480 ms) and was maximal at 430 ms. C1 captured variance related to the stereotyped 
visual ERPs: posterior N1 and P1, anterior P2. As in the average ERP, the anterior 
positivity extended into left ventral lateral channels.  
 
_________________________________ 
 
Figure 17. (next page) ERP signature of evaluative cognition in Study 3. The grand 
Average ERP (blue=self-evaluation, red = other-evaluation) is 1 s long following a 200 
ms baseline before stimulus onset (vertical line).  
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 C2 was the second largest component (27% of the variance), as in the previous 
study. The C2 waveform was maximal between 400ms-850ms and peaked at 400 ms. C2 
topography reflected the MFN and an early aspect of the LPC (the P1 reprise) of the 
average ERP. Of note was the asymmetrical pattern in anterior ventral lateral channels; 
positivity on the left and negativity on the right.  
 C3 was the third largest component (13% of the variance). The C3 waveform was 
maximal between 400-850 ms and had a rounded shape with a peaked feature at 680 ms. 
The topography of C3 reflected features of the classic P300 positivity in posterior 
channels.  
 C4 was the largest component (31% of the variance), as in the previous study. 
Starting at 450 ms, the C3 waveform was rounded in shape and extended beyond the 
analytic window. This component captured variance related to the parietal slow wave, or 
late positive potential (LPP), observed in the average ERP. C3 topography was a broad, 
right lateralized positivity in posterior channels and a central positivity in anterior 
channels.  
 C5-C7 accounted for 5%, 4% and 3% of the variance, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 18. Decomposition of the posterior positivity in Study 3. Left: LPC from a central 
parietal channel 119 (Pz). Right: Data decomposed into three principal components at 
channel 119 (Pz). Both panels reflect self-evaluation, only. 
 
 
 Effects of task type and word valence in component amplitude. Figure 20 
provides topographic maps of component amplitude and statistical testing. There was a 
main effect in C4, where self-evaluation was more positive in anterior channels, 
F(1,35)=21.65, p<.001, η2=.382. Though not statistically significant self-evaluation was 
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more robust than the semantic task in the left lateral negativity over temporal cortex, 
across all components. This effect is most robust in C2, where voltage in anterior lateral 
channels appears asymmetric. The distribution of t-statistics in C2, was consistent with 
the absence of a left frontal positivity in self-evaluation, and an attenuated right anterior 
ventral negativity in the semantic tasks. In C3, the statistical distribution, though below 
threshold for significance, suggests self-evaluation more positive in anterior midline 
channels, and more negative in anterior ventral channels, particularly on the right.  
 C2 showed statistically significant mean differences between good and bad trials 
in right ventral lateral channels, F(1,35)=13.12 ,p=.001, η2=.272. Good word trials were 
more negative than bad word trials. Good word trials were more positive than bad word 
trials in central and right posterior channels, F(1,35)=17.9,p<.001, η2=.338. The 
distribution of t-statistics in C3 suggested asymmetric effects in the dorsal positivity; 
good greater than bad on the right and bad greater than good on the left. This pattern was 
reversed in C4.  
 No interaction effect was statistically significant in C2-C4. Although the t-
distribution suggests that the medial negativity is greater in the semantic task, there is 
more evidence of an interaction effect in C2 average topomaps; the medial negativity is 
larger for good words in the self-evaluation task, and for bad words in the semantic task. 
 Neural correlates of trait affect. No statistically significant correlation of trait 
affect (NA and PA) and component amplitude was found in C2 or C3. 
 
_________________________________ 
 
Figure 19. (next page) Effects of task type and valence in component amplitude. A. 
Topographic plots of component amplitude (red=positive, blue=negative) on the scalp 
surface (nose pointing up). B. Topographic plot of t-statistics at each channel (p-value 
noted in color palette).   
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Summary of Results 
 Measuring frontal lobe control systems. In time course and topography, the 
factor structure in Study 3 replicated findings in Study 2. The posterior positive complex 
was again decomposed into three separate components, with anterior topography 
comparable to the previous study. The C4 waveform replicated the time course observed 
in Study 2. This further supports the hypothesis that the shifted latency in C4 may be 
related to response time, which was delayed in Study 2 and Study 3, but immediate in 
Study 1. C2 was broader in Study 3 and the midline negativity was attenuated relative to 
previous findings.   
I then looked at the effects of two experimental variables (i.e., task type and word 
valence) in component amplitude. Effects of valence in word stimuli was primarily 
associated with C2 (staring at 200 ms). For both categorization and self-evaluation, good 
words evoked greater positivity in posterior channels. The most robust effect of word 
valence was over right ventral lateral frontal cortex in C2; replicating findings from the 
previous study. It appears that activity in this area represents an anterior correlate of the 
posterior P1r; a negativity that, like the P300 positivity, is more robust when the brain is 
processing pleasant or positive stimuli.   
 Though not statistically significant, there was an earlier effect of task type, from 
200 ms to 600 ms in C2. This effect was localized to an anterior ventral positivity that 
appeared over the left hemisphere, and was more coherent in the semantic condition. The 
left hemisphere is preferentially involved in language processing; and the acquisition of 
semantic meaning might occur within this time window (Neville & Bavelier, 1998). In 
the left temporal pole, the language path is connected to ventral limbic structures, such as 
the amygdala. It may be that basic language processing in the categorization task 
recruited more ventral limbic engagement than in the self-evaluation task. Taken 
together, effects of valence and task type in C2 suggest asymmetric engagement of the 
frontal lobe; language-related differences on the left and emotion processing on the right.  
 The most robust finding was a main effect of task type in C4. Self-evaluation was 
greater than categorization in the second half of the epoch. This effect is most consistent 
with previous reports (Esslen et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2013). It is notable that there was no 
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effect of word valence in C4, suggesting that affective attributes of the stimulus were 
irrelevant to the processes represented by this factor. 
 Neural correlates of trait mood in the decision-making epoch. In a second 
analysis, I identified neural correlates of trait mood. In contrast with results of the 
previous study, there was no significant correlation of trait affect scores and component 
amplitude in selected channels. This is surprising given the robust nature of the finding in 
the previous sample. It is notable that NA and PA scores were not correlated in Study 3. 
Although the constructs are theoretically orthogonal, PA and NA scores are often 
correlated. Also notable was the failure to replicate the dimensional specificity 
hypothesis; that PA would predict responses to good words and NA would predict 
responses to bad words. In Study 3, PA predicted endorsement patterns, while NA did 
not. It is unclear why these patterns of correlation differ between Study 2 and Study 3.  
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS  
 This research is an investigation of how affective and cognitive processes interact 
in the frontal lobe during self-evaluative decision-making. Although mood-cognition 
interaction could be studied in a variety of experimental contexts, self-evaluation is the 
focus of this research for several reasons. First, there is an apparent association of mood 
state and evaluation bias in behavioral measures. This provided a pattern of variance that 
could be subsequently identified in neural measures. Second, self-evaluation bias is used 
to describe core symptoms of mood and anxiety disorders. Some treatments target self-
evaluative behavior directly, and self-reported emotional experience is commonly used to 
measure treatment efficacy. This alignment with psychometrics was central to the 
research strategy; it provided a unique opportunity to convolve ERP analysis with 
psychometric methods. Finally, emotional decision-making evokes functions of frontal 
lobe, self-regulatory systems. Whether implicit or explicit, self-appraisal is inherent to 
on-going, social self-regulation. Characterization of frontal lobe mechanisms in this 
context provides insight into the neural basis of adaptive and dysfunctional social 
behavior.  
 In this chapter, I provide a synopsis and tentative interpretation of the findings. I 
begin with a brief review of the control-systems framework. This model posits 
dimensional affective-arousal bias in neural self-regulation. I explore how psychological 
phenomena, including the positivity bias in self-evaluative cognition, are an emergent 
property of these reciprocal control systems. In this, cognition is viewed as a process. A 
cognitive act involves the projection of a predictive model (i.e., schema) and experience 
dependent updating of that model. These stages of processing are also represented in 
components of the decision-making ERP.  
 I then explore classical theories of depression (e.g., learned helplessness) through 
the lens of neural self-regulation. I extend this discussion to the brain basis of 
psychotherapeutic, psychopharmacological and neural stimulation treatments for 
depression. I suggest that the loss of positivity bias in depression may disrupt the process 
of cognition by limiting the extent to which learned schema are updated through 
 88 
interaction with the environment. Co-morbid anxiety, I argue, may be an adaptive 
compensation for loss of positive arousal that effectively drives attention outward.  
 In this research, I implemented two analytic strategies to elucidate network 
dynamics in self-evaluative cognition. Both convolve psychometric methods with ERP 
analysis. I first review rationale and findings of the neuropsychometric approach. These 
findings guided the subsequent investigation in which I used factor analysis to 
deconstruct the decision-making ERP. As hypothesized, the factor analysis reduced the 
posterior positivity into three components. This component structure was replicated in 
three separate samples.  
 A central goal of this research was to characterize effects of depression in the 
component structure. I review the results of Study 1, which involved depressed and non-
depressed adults. Results showed between group effects in component 2 (C2) and 
component 3 (C3). I return briefly to non-neural measures and address the hypothesis that 
trait mood (PA and NA) each predict different aspects of self-evaluative behavior. 
Results are mixed but suggest some future directions for research in this area.  A related 
hypothesis was directed at neural measures. Based on a control-systems framework, I 
predicted that PA and NA biases would be observed over the right and left hemisphere, 
respectively. The hypothesis was partially supported by the correlation between ventral 
lateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) and individual differences in PA.    
 VLPFC was implicated across studies as a correlate of positive affect, positive 
self-appraisal bias and depression severity. VLPFC was also enhanced in trials of the 
self-evaluation task that involved socially desirable, or “good” words. In C3, a non-linear 
relationship was identified between VLPFC and symptom severity. An inflection point in 
neural activity occurred at the threshold for clinical significance in the symptom profile. I 
briefly explore these results relative to research on intentional emotion regulation. I 
speculate that VLPFC effects might reflect the active suppression of affective motivation, 
particularly positive affect. I suggest that PA suppression might be adaptive in the context 
of C2 functions (i.e., stimulus evaluation), but not in the context of C3 functions (i.e., 
updating of neural schema). I speculate that symptoms of depression might be related to 
the over-suppression of positive affect at this stage of the decision-making epoch.  
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 In the last section of this chapter, I consolidate findings across experiments and 
consider the functional significance of each latent factor. C1 appears to be a stereotyped 
response to visual stimuli. C2 might reflect the evaluation of word stimuli relative to 
expectations (i.e., internal schema). In C2, the ventral cortico-limbic system appears 
dominant. C3 appears related to memory consolidation and the updating on schema based 
on the evaluative event. In C3, the dorsal cortico-limbic system appears dominant.  C4 
might reflect sustained attention and emotion regulation. These tentative results suggest 
that the latent factors are meaningful. The analytic strategies developed herein might be 
used in future research to test network-oriented hypotheses and models neural self-
regulation in the frontal lobe.  
Control-Systems Framework for Interpreting Results 
 In this research, participants consistently showed a positive self-evaluation bias. 
On average, participants in the child and adolescent sample engaged in positive self-
evaluation on 73% of the trials. In two separate samples of undergraduate young adults, 
positive self-appraisal occurred in 72% and 75% of trials, respectively. Across all studies, 
measures of trait mood predicted individual differences in evaluative behavior. As 
predicted, positive bias was decreased in a sample of depressed adults (65%), compared 
to a non-depressed, “control” group (79%). Results also showed a non-linear relationship 
between evaluation and symptom severity; the decline in positivity bias was better 
predicted by changes in the symptom profile when depression was more severe.  
 This non-linear relationship observed between positive self-evaluation bias and 
depression severity could be interpreted as a shift in the neural dynamics of frontal lobe 
self-regulation. A model of frontal lobe functioning posits reciprocal, affect-biased, 
control systems (Tucker & Luu, 2012; Waters & Tucker, 2013a). The dorsal cortico-
limbic system is motivated by positive affective-arousal. It provides a projectional, 
ballistic mode of operation. In both the motor and psychological domain, this impetus to 
action is based on internal need states and guided by slow learned (i.e., experience 
dependent), predictive schema. The ventral cortico-limbic system is motivated by 
negative affective-arousal. It provides a vigilant mode of operation that focuses attention 
outward and drives rapid learning with feedback from sensory events. Cognition is a 
process that emerges from this affective dynamic. As depression becomes more severe, 
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there may be less dominance of the neural systems that are responsive to external events. 
Instead, the cognitive process is biased inwardly and reactivity to environmental variance 
is decreased. This is consistent with observations of increased self-focus in depression 
(Rimes & Watkins, 2005), as well as disengagement from activities (MacPhillamy & 
Lewinsohn, 1974) and, in severe cases, a decline in reactivity to emotional stimuli 
(Tucker, Luu, Frishkoff, et al., 2003).  
 A control-systems model of self-regulation in the frontal cortex also provides a 
framework for translating valuable psychological theories into the neural milieu. For 
example, it suggests several hypothetical routes from transient sadness to lasting and 
maladaptive depression. Transient depressive symptoms may reflect an adaptive response 
to loss (e.g., a social exclusion event; DeWall & Baumeister, 2006). Adaptation might 
involve suppression of positive affective-arousal in the dorsal cortical-limbic path, 
limiting motivation for projective behavior. When events are consistently aversive, a 
more stable bias in frontal lobe dynamics could be a result of learning (i.e., learned 
helplessness, kindling hypothesis; Maier & Seligman, 1976; Monroe & Harkness, 2005). 
Alternatively, an individual might have a genetic predisposition that makes it difficult to 
alter this suppressive bias once a shift in the dynamic has occurred (i.e., stress diathesis; 
Monroe & Simons, 1991). Depressive states are also induced when affective arousal is 
mechanically or chemically disrupted in the brain, independent of experience dependent 
biases (i.e., neurological depression; Blumer & Benson, 1975; Mayberg, 1997). 
Frontal Lobe Mechanics Instructing Treatment for Depression 
 The neural mechanics of psychological and psychiatric treatment can also be 
explored within a control-systems framework. The results of this research suggest an 
inflection point at which cognitive bias is more closely tied to somatic complaints. 
Effective behavior therapies address these dysfunctional thinking patterns indirectly by 
instead promoting engagement in activities, regardless of the patient’s motivation to do 
so (Jacobson, Martell, & Dimidjian, 2001). It may be that this sensory and motor 
engagement with the environment necessitates a shift in frontal lobe control biases. The 
lasting impact of continued behavioral activation is that cognitive processes, including 
the activation of self-schema, must assimilate and accommodate a perfusion of new 
information (Waters & Tucker, 2013a).  
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 It is notable that the ventral cortical-limbic system of the frontal lobe is 
preferentially attentive to the environment. The affective-arousal bias in the ventral 
system is inherently anxious, motivating sensory vigilance and the testing of predictive 
schema. This is consistent with the frustration-learning hypothesis that combines neural 
and behavioral evidence to show that negative affect is essential to adaptive learning 
(Tucker & Luu, 2007; Waters & Tucker, 2012). It follows that an anxious response to 
grief, loss or surprising non-reward might represent an adaptive shift in the frontal lobe 
dynamic. Similar to behavior activation therapy, anxiety that is co-morbid with mild or 
moderate depression may sometimes represent compensatory motivation to attend 
outward.  
 Psychopharmacological treatments for depression also alter the control dynamics 
of the frontal lobe by enhancing the availability of certain neurotransmitters. Although 
the mechanism of action is complex and largely unknown, the first-line of anti-
depressants target serotonin and norepinephrine systems that innervate dorsal affective-
arousal systems, in particular (Ressler & Nemeroff, 2000). Functions motivated by 
positive affect are thereby enhanced, and patients are consequently more alert and 
interested in their surroundings. A similar effect is reported in cases of severe depression 
following deep brain stimulation (DBS) of frontal limbic regions (Holtzheimer & 
Mayberg, 2011). A less invasive neural stimulation treatment, transcranial magnetic 
stimuluation (rTMS), instead applies the rhythmic electrical current to the dorsal cortices 
of the frontal lobe. The current is thought to balance asymmetry in the dorsal system 
(Teneback et al., 1999). More effective than rTMS is electroconvulsive shock therapy 
(ECT). ECT sends a current through the frontal lobe, and likely overrides biases in the 
control system dynamic (Sackeim et al., 1996). As the patient recovers, some of the 
dysfunctional control biases have been “reset” and the cortex is potentiated for change. 
Immediately following electrical stimulation with cognitive behavioral therapies could 
promote lasting change. 
 Observed at the systems level, these frontal lobe dynamics suggests testable 
hypotheses related to the onset and maintenance of depression, co-morbid anxiety and 
depression, as well as the mechanisms of change in treatment. An obstacle to advancing 
this research area is that empirical support for systems-level theory is largely derived 
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from studies of isolated neural phenomena (e.g., P300). Efforts to measure network 
functionality, as in the current research, are a recent priority.  
Investigating the Neural Mechanisms of Affective Cognition 
 Two methodological innovations were central to the current research: the 
neuropsychometric approach to ERP analysis and the application of principal components 
analysis (PCA) to the study of network dynamics. Both strategies were adapted from 
psychometric methodology, which has been productive in describing latent characteristics 
of affective experience from patterns of covariance. Furthermore, psychometric methods 
are uniquely applicable to both exploratory research and to the development of applied 
measurement tools. Though beyond the scope of current knowledge, this could also be a 
goal of clinical neuroscience: to develop brain-based metrics of individual differences in 
neural constructs. Exploratory research into the self-regulatory dynamics of the frontal 
lobe may be further advanced with early orientation toward this goal.  
 The neuropsychometric approach investigated the neural effects of PA and NA 
mood dimensions in the word stimuli of a self-evaluation task (Waters & Tucker, 2013b). 
Clinical research suggests that patterns of reactivity to emotional stimuli might help to 
differentiate features of mood and anxiety disorders, but findings are mixed (Fitzgerald et 
al., 2008). A standard approach to testing effects of stimulus valence is to divide stimuli 
into two groups (good and bad) and then average across all trials in each category. In 
doing so, variance in the neural signal related to unique affective attributes of each word 
is lost. Second, it is unlikely that the valence dimension (good-bad) reflects patterns of 
affective arousal in neural systems. It may be more accurate to align stimulus attributes 
with PA and NA. These reflect the affective biases in the perceptive mechanism, the 
brain.  
 Using a neuropsychometric approach, single trial variance in the psychometric 
properties of PA and NA was used to generate average ERPs. The central tendency of PA 
and NA was observed in weighted-average waveforms. Weighted averages showed a 
differentiation in PA and NA at 400 ms in anterior channels, coincident with the MFN 
waveform. These results suggest that the cognitive process involves evaluation of 
stimulus affectivity at that time. Overall, effects of psychometric weighting showed NA 
larger than PA, as if the calm-anxious dimension better characterized the affective nature 
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of the self-evaluation task. Finally, the neuropsychometric approach revealed EEG 
features that separated dorsal-posterior cortex and ventral-anterior cortex. Consistent with 
the control-systems framework, this whole-brain effect might reflect reciprocal network 
dynamics in the decision-making epoch (Waters & Tucker, 2013b).   
Factor Analysis in ERP Research 
 To further investigate this phenomenon, I again borrowed from psychometric 
methodology. In the study of mood dimensionality, factor analysis was used to define 
constituent parts of emotional experience, PA and NA (Watson & Tellegen, 1985). In 
ERP research, factor analysis is instead used to clean EEG data, or to study an ERP 
waveform in isolation (Dien & Frishkoff, 2005). Following the methods of psychometric 
research, I instead used factor analysis to investigate the latent factor structure of the 
decision-making ERP. I hypothesized that the time course and whole-brain topography of 
latent factors would be consistent with the reciprocal action of limbic-cortical control 
systems. Relative to an affective-arousal model of neural self-regulation, I further 
hypothesized that factors might reflect shifting dominance between PA and NA bias, and 
thus differentiate depressed from neurotypical responses. 
 As this was an exploratory investigation, my hypotheses and strategy were guided 
by a previous application of principal components analysis (PCA) to a series of ERPs that 
are relevant to mood-cognition interaction in decision-making. Among this series is the 
classic P300, followed the late positive potential (LPP). The P300 and LPP ERPs are 
modulated by stimulus valence and trait affect (J. Polich, 2007). The LPP is also 
modulated by intentional emotion regulation (G. Hajcak & Nieuwenhuis, 2006). An early 
constituent of the posterior positivity, the P1r, has received less attention, but also 
appears to be modulated by affect (Waters & Tucker, 2013b). A challenge in this research 
is that the P1r, P300 and LPP are superimposed in time and topography, summing to 
produce a wide, positive going ERP over the parietal cortex. Very recently, a handful of 
investigators have used PCA to decompose the posterior positivity into constituent parts 
(Greg Hajcak, Dunning, & Foti, 2009). The focus of this research, however, remains 
isolated on one or another ERP.   
 The current research builds on this recent effort by widening the context of the 
PCA decomposition to the study of whole brain dynamics. As predicted, the P1r, P300 
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and LPP were divided into the largest components of a seven-factor structure (i.e., 
accounting for the most variance). This pattern replicated across three separate studies, as 
did the general topography of each component (Figures 20-21). The latent factor structure 
described correlated activity on the entire scalp surface; grouping the classical average 
ERPs that are commonly studied in isolation.  Importantly, this topography included both 
posterior and anterior effects, which are of particular importance to depression research.  
   
 
 
Figure 20. Replication of factor structure across three studies. Time scale in ms, stimulus 
onset at grey bar. All waveforms at Pz (or channel 119). 
 
 
 
Depression Neuropathology in Self-Evaluative Cognition 
 The frontal lobe functions are essential in decision-making, social cognition, and 
affective self-regulation. This circuitry may be altered in depression, as evidenced by 
predictable changes in self-evaluative behavior. A secondary goal of this research was to 
characterize effects of depression in the latent factor structure. Findings place isolated 
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ERP components in a functional context and provide a preliminary measure of whole 
brain dynamics that may be pathological in clinical populations. The components analysis 
characterized effects of depression with striking specificity. C2 was exaggerated in 
individuals reporting more severe and frequent symptoms of depression. C3, in contrast, 
was attenuated in this group. The time course and topography of these components may 
differentiate anxious and depressed affective biases in the clinical sample. 
 C2 captures the variance of the MFN, a well-studied average ERP, and a posterior 
correlate, the P1r.  The MFN is part of a suite of medial frontal negativities that are 
responsive to discrepant events, negative feedback and errors (Phan Luu et al., 2000). It is 
exaggerated in clinical anxiety and high NA. The P1r retraces some of the visual 
pathways following frontal lobe processing of stimuli. Given what is known about these 
two ERP components, C2 appears involved in stimulus processing. In anxious-
depression, it may also capture an exaggerated negative response to word stimuli.  
 In C3, variance in the P300 is correlated with an anterior positivity. The P300 is 
associated with memory functions and updating of the context (i.e., schema) following an 
event (Donchin & Coles, 1988). P300 amplitude is decreased in depression and low PA 
(Polich, 1998). It is larger in yes-good trials and correlates with the positivity bias in 
memory recall (L. A. Watson et al., 2007).  C3 appears to index functions related to the 
neural assimilation of information that has been drawn from the evaluative event. It may 
be that in depression, there is less adaptation of internal schema (including self-schema), 
particularly in response to rewarding (i.e., positive) events. 
Affective Dimensionality and Self-Evaluative Behavior  
 Further consideration of comorbid anxiety and depression was addressed in 
behavioral measures of self-evaluation. I tested a dimensional specificity hypothesis in 
self-evaluative behavior: that trait PA scores will predict responses to desirable words, 
and trait NA scores will predict responses to undesirable words. In the child and 
adolescent sample as well as the clinical sample, this hypothesis was supported; PA was 
uniquely predictive of responses to positive words, and NA was uniquely predictive of 
responses to negative words. The decline of positive endorsement in depression, 
however, was equally attributable to behavior change on good- and bad-word trials. In 
Study 2, support for the hypothesis was modest; both PA and NA were predictive of 
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either word type but effect sizes were consistent with the hypothesized pattern. In Study 
3, only PA predicted endorsement behavior involving either word type. Taken together, 
results suggest that the PA scale is most consistently related to self-appraisal and that the 
hypothesized pattern might only appear in clinical samples and youth. 
 This line of inquiry is significant because it suggests that the decline in positivity 
bias involves more rejection of desirable traits in depression, and more endorsement of 
negative traits in anxiety. To the extent that this distinguishes clinical presentations and 
generalizes beyond the psychometric task, it may also instruct the development of 
targeted therapeutic activities. In future research, convergent measures of trait affect 
should be used to reduce the redundancy in the bivariate measure. Using the current 
method, results might simply reflect a replication of Tellegan and Watson’s (1985) initial 
observation of PA and NA factors in emotional experience. It follows that so classifying 
word stimuli on the self-evaluation task would enhance the predictive nature of a PA and 
NA summary score. It may be most productive, however, to test the hypothesis in a 
naturalistic setting where “rejection of the desirable” and “acceptance of the undesirable” 
can be operationalized in a broader behavioral repertoire.  
Neural Correlates of Self-Regulation in RVLPFC 
 In addition to characterizing affect-cognition interaction in behavioral measures, I 
identified neural correlates of mood and self-evaluation within the latent factor structure. 
Right ventral lateral prefrontal cortex (RVLPFC) was consistently implicated. In C3, the 
component attenuated in the depression, the relationship between symptom severity and 
RVLPFC intensity was non-linear; intensity increased with mild to moderate symptoms 
but then decreased in individuals who reported severe and frequent symptoms. As in the 
behavioral data, there appeared to be an inflection point in the sample that implied a 
categorical shift in frontal lobe dynamics.  
 It may be that, as symptoms become clinically significant, there is a transition in 
the neural self-regulation dynamic of the frontal cortex. One interpretation is that in 
neurotypical functioning, the regulatory action of RVLPFC increases with a decline in 
positive mood. But in clinically significant depression, RVLPFC is increasingly 
withdrawn from emotional events. A similar shift has been observed in medial frontal 
response to negative feedback; the MFN is exaggerated in mild depression and anxiety, 
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but then declines with more severe and frequent symptoms (Tucker, Luu, Frishkoff, et al., 
2003).  
 Results of Study 2, however, were not consistent with this interpretation. Instead, 
the neural response of non-depressed, young adult participants replicated those observed 
in the more severely depressed sample; RVLPFC negativity on the scalp surface 
decreased as trait PA decreased. Study 2 also showed that the effect was not specific to 
self-evaluation; effect sizes in the other-evaluation task may even be larger. However, 
additional evidence for RVLPFC engagement with positive emotional experience 
appeared in the valence contrast. Good word trials evoked a larger negativity in RVLPFC 
than did bad word trials. This effect was particularly robust in C2, where it also replicated 
in Study 3. In this separate sample of non-depressed young adults, however, the linear 
association between RVLPFC and mood was absent.  
 Though inconsistent across studies, the RVLPFC effect is notable. First, it 
addressed the hypothesis posited by the affective-arousal model that left and right 
hemispheres show an NA and PA bias, respectively. PA (not NA) correlates were 
identified over right hemisphere (not left hemisphere). Second, it is consistent with 
evidence from other research domains that implicates RVLPFC in emotion regulation, 
and the regulation of positive affect, in particular. For example, the most consistent injury 
producing secondary mania (pathologically high PA) is a lesion of the right ventrolateral 
frontal or basal temporal cortex (Starkstein, Fedoroff, Berthier, & Robinson, 1991). 
RVLPFC metabolism has been shown to increase when individuals engage cognitive 
strategies to suppress an emotional response (Lieberman et al., 2007). Some have shown 
that this suppression effect is specific to positive emotional experiences (Light et al., 
2011). Enhanced RVLPFC activity during positive affect suppression was also predictive 
of poor treatment outcome in depressed individuals, as if the pathology was related to 
over-suppression of positive affect.  A recent analysis of tractography data by Mayberg 
and colleagues showed that integrity of RVLPFC connectivity (greater local and reduced 
global connectivity) is associated with resiliency in individuals at risk for depression 
(Cisler et al., 2013).  
 If RVLPFC activity represents the suppression of positive affect, interpretation of 
the current finding would be paradoxical. Results show more RVLPFC activity (i.e., 
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more suppression) with increasingly positive experiences (e.g., positive words, higher 
PA, lower BDI scores). However, time course and topography of the latent factor 
structure offers some compelling context for speculation (Figure 21). C2 is involved in 
appraising the extent to which external events deviate from expectations (i.e., schema), 
and shows an NA bias. It may be that RVLPFC suppression of PA is adaptive in C2 
functioning, and therefor more robust in persons who present a strong PA bias. C3, in 
contrast, reflects the updating internal schema following an informative event. It may be 
that cortical control of PA should be released at this stage of the decision-making epoch, 
as encoding processes require engagement of the dorsal, slow-learning system. 
Importantly, RVLPFC suppression continued in C3 for depressed study participants. This 
may reflect dysfunction in the reciprocal dynamic of control systems, such that 
impairment in C3 functions contribute to a stable decrease in positive self-evaluation 
bias. 
Tentative Interpretation of the Component Structure 
 Component 1: stereotyped visual response. Across studies, C1 captured 
variance in the stereotyped visual response (i.e., visual P1, visual N1, frontal P2) and was 
the forth factor (i.e., explained less variance than C1-C3). This early component preceded 
the posterior positivity in the decision-making ERP and was therefore not a focus of 
analyses.  
 Component 2: evaluation of word stimuli. C2 reflects dominance of ventral 
cortical limbic characteristics including anxious affective bias and cognitive processing 
of stimuli. Effects of emotion variables were paradoxical, suggesting some reciprocity 
between dorsal and ventral networks in the suppression of positive affect. 
 
_________________________________ 
 
Figure 21. (next page) Topography of component amplitude across studies.  
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 Across studies, C2 reaches a maximum in a time window previously associated 
with effects of word valence and endorsement decisions. In posterior channels, C2 
captured the P1r, an early component of the posterior positivity. The P1r recapitulates a 
visual response as if engaged in re-entrant stimulus processing. Correlated activity in 
anterior channels of C2 captured variance in the MFN, an average ERP waveform 
associated with the detection of discrepancy from expectation, error self-monitoring and 
feedback monitoring. An exaggerated MFN has been associated with anxiety (high NA) 
and moderate depression, but appears attenuated in severe depression (Phan Luu et al., 
2000; Tucker, Luu, Frishkoff, et al., 2003). Taken together, these characteristics strongly 
associate C2 with the evaluative portion of the decision-making ERP. 
 C2 topography appears asymmetric in the ventral lateral frontal lobe: positive 
going on the left and negative going on the right. The negativity over right ventral lateral 
prefrontal cortex (RVLPFC) was consistently associated with positive emotional 
variables: enhanced in response to good words and self-evaluation, positively correlated 
with PA in the healthy control samples, and negatively correlated with BDI in the clinical 
sample. Correlates of positive self-evaluation bias also followed this pattern, implicating 
bilateral anterior ventral cortices, as well as the right rostral anterior cingulate cortex.  
 Paradoxically, metabolic and neurological evidence suggests the hypothesis that 
RVLPFC activity is greater during positive affect suppression. Yet these results show 
increased activity with positive emotional behavior and variables. The context of word 
stimulus processing suggests an interpretation; C2 might capture ventral constraint on 
dorsal biases. Indeed, stimulus processing is an inherently anxious event that would 
require suppression of the projective mode, motivated by positive affect. In adaptive 
functioning (e.g., evaluation of a visual stimulus) this active suppression effect might be 
stronger in persons with higher trait positive affect. 
 Contrary to this hypothesis, however, C2 amplitude was exaggerated in 
depression over anterior medial, and right posterior cortex. This might be an effect of co-
morbid anxiety present in the clinical sample. The effect was strong, as if participants 
with clinically significant symptoms were more anxiously engaged in stimulus 
processing. But this exaggerated effect in the clinical sample is inconsistent with results 
of the correlation analysis, which associated exaggerated C2 features with increasing PA 
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and positive valence. To understand this paradoxical effect, it may be helpful to 
recognize that group mean differences in scalp amplitude may be independent of linear 
patterns (i.e., in VLPFC). The implication of these scalp findings, it follows, is that the 
linear effects in RVLPFC of depressed-anxious individuals might take place in a 
fundamentally altered milieu; one that begins with an exaggerated suppression of dorsal 
functions. Similarly, amplified indices of stimulus processing in the clinical sample might 
represent a compensatory drive to override the apathy of low positive affect. In 
depression, it may take more of C2 to engage in the task.  
 Component 3: updating self-schema in the central midline. C3 reflects a shift 
in stimulus processing from evaluation to neural encoding of the event. This memory-
related process is better associated with dorsal functions; slow learning networks of the 
dorsal midline (Waters & Tucker, 2012). Across studies, C3 was maximal within the time 
window of the classic P300 of the average ERP. The P300 is related to attention and 
memory encoding (Donchin & Coles, 1988). It is sensitive to events that provide 
information relative to a motivational context. From a control-systems perspective, 
learning and memory represent the ongoing process of developing and adjusting 
predictive models, or neural schema. Although the self-evaluation task in this experiment 
is removed from typical social behavior, the process still involves projection and 
updating of a self-schema. Though effects were subtle, self-evaluation was greater than 
other evaluation along the midline in Study 2, particularly over the central midline. In 
Study 3, condition effects were again oriented along the midline in C3; self-evaluation 
was greater than the categorization task, particularly over anterior midline. Research on 
the neural basis of self, and self-reflective cognition consistently implicates the midline 
cortical structures (Qin & Northoff, 2011).  
 In Study 2, more robust effects of valence (good>bad) were also oriented along 
the midline. This valence effect has been previously reported in the context of self-
evaluation. Since P300 is sensitive to motivational context, this effect is thought to reflect 
the positivity bias in self-evaluation. Relevant to this, C3 was attenuated in Study 1 for 
participants with moderate to severe symptoms of depression. Furthermore, C3 was the 
factor that accounted for the most variance in Study 1. In Study 2 and Study 3, however, 
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C3 was the smallest of the first four components. Taken together, these observations 
suggest an relationship of C3 with depression neuropathology. 
 The correlation analysis, however, complicates the picture. In Study 2, C3 showed 
some evidence of an effect that was robust in C2: higher PA and positive words were 
associated with greater activity in RVLPFC. For depressed participants in Study 1, 
RVLPFC was also greater with more engagement in positive self-evaluation. Unlike C2, 
however, C3 showed a non-linear of BDI scores and RVLPFC activity; for depressed 
participants, the inverse correlation of RVLPFC and symptom severity remained 
consistent with C2. For non-depressed participants, however, the pattern reversed such 
that RVLPFC activity was the least in those reporting the fewest symptoms. I previously 
speculated that RVLPFC activity was related to positive affect suppression. This finding 
suggests that in C3, it may be adaptive to release inhibition on positive affect in order to 
facilitate encoding processes in the dorsal cortex. Consistent with this conceptualization, 
the low symptom group showed no correlation between self-evaluation bias and VLPFC. 
Instead, self-evaluation bias was associated with visual cortex. These effects may reflect 
an adaptive part of the consolidation process; a shift from ventral-anterior stimulus 
processing to dorsal-posterior encoding of the event. It may be that in depression, C3 
functions are disrupted by pathology in the shift from PA suppression to dominance of 
the dorsal network.  
 Component 4: sustained attention. Across studies, C4 captured variance in the 
LPP, of the average ERP. The LPP responds to emotional and arousing stimuli (G. 
Hajcak et al., 2010). It is also reduced by voluntary regulation of negative emotion (G. 
Hajcak & Nieuwenhuis, 2006). There is some evidence that the LPP is only present with 
conscious awareness of a stimulus. Taken together, C4 may represent a state of sustained 
attention to the affective quality of an event that serves as a volitional or innate form of 
emotion regulation.  
 Consistent with this hypothesis, self-evaluation was greater than semantic-
categorization over dorsal anterior cortex, as if additional attention resources were 
recruited following social appraisal. Valence effects showed a similar anterior 
distribution (good>bad) as well as a left posterior effect (bad>good). Particularly over the 
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frontal cortex, these effects might relate to features of the study paradigm designed to 
extend and deepen the evaluative experience of participants.   
 In Study 2 and Study 3, I decreased the timed nature of the task by cueing 
responses 1 second after the onset of the word stimulus. I also altered the responses from 
a dichotomous option (like me, not like me) to a four-point scale. These adaptations of the 
experimental design were intended to increase the introspective nature of the task, and 
decrease the simple valence judgment. They may have also had a telling impact on the C4 
structure and topography. Most notably, a focal anterior positivity shifts to C4 in Study 2 
and Study 3. The wave shape of C4 also changed such that it extends beyond the analytic 
window. Finally, of the first four factors in Study 1, C4 explained the least amount of 
variance. In Study 2 and 3, however, C4 was the largest factor, capturing most of the 
variance in the sample. It may be that this variance was generated by a somewhat 
introspective delay before the response. It is as if some attention-related resources have 
shifted forward in the time course of the decision-making ERP. Future research might 
explore the hypothesis that C4 will be exaggerated as a function of ruminative behavior. 
Conclusions 
 Across a series of three studies, measures of mood state predicted positive self-
evaluation bias. Positive bias was decreased in depressed individuals, and there appears 
to be an enhancement of the mood-cognition relationship in the context of clinically 
significant symptoms. Activity in right ventral lateral prefrontal cortex was identified as a 
neural correlate of trait positive affect. This predictive relationship might reflect positive 
affect suppression. This may be adaptive through evaluative stages of the decision-
making epoch, but maladaptive in subsequent encoding stages.  
 As hypothesized, statistical decomposition separated a posterior positivity in three 
components. The pointed and round features previously identified with the 
neuropsychometric approach were also observed in separate component waveforms. A 
goal of this research was to align latent factors of the evaluative ERP with a model of 
neural self-regulation. Germane to this goal, the factor structure was replicated in time 
course and topography across three independent studies. 
 C2 appeared integral to the evaluation of word stimuli; a stage at which semantic 
meaning is compared with affect-biased expectations. Asymmetric effects in ventral 
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lateral prefrontal cortex suggested preferential engagement of the ventral cortico-limbic 
system. It follows that exaggeration of C2 in the depressed sample might reflect co-
morbid anxiety, which is adaptive insofar as it promotes engagement in the evaluative 
task. However, instead of an NA bias, correlates of PA were detected in C2. Interpreted 
as PA suppression, the effect might also represent adaptive emotion regulation in service 
of task engagement. C3 may be involved in the updating of neural schema following the 
evaluative event. The topography of this component was most consistent with dorsal 
cortico-limbic system. Evidence supports the hypothesis that PA suppression is not 
adaptive in C3, and may represent a locus of pathology in depression. C4 appears to 
reflect sustained attention following the evaluative, and intrinsic management of affect-
biased dynamics following an emotional effect.  
 Though speculative, this synthesis suggests testable hypotheses for future 
research. An advantage of observing ERP phenomena within a factor structure is that it 
allows for a whole brain decomposition of temporally distinct processing stages. This 
exploratory analysis may be the first to observe the decision-making epoch in putative 
measures of EEG network dynamics. Findings demonstrate the potential in convolving 
psychometric methods with brain imaging research to measure individual differences in 
neural dynamics.  
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